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 1 
Summary 
     The consequences of climate change are becoming increasingly clear and there is broad 
agreement on the fact that it will affect small island developing states to a large extent, to 
which it may force entire populations to relocate. As the issue of climate induced migration is 
largely unregulated, this thesis therefore seeks to examine if states could claim state 
responsibility for climate change, if a migration scheme could be awarded as a form of 
remedy and if a state could succeed in bringing forward such a case.   
     As a small island developing state located in the Pacific Ocean, the Republic of Kiribati is 
used as a case example in the assessment. Its typographical conditions makes the state 
particularly vulnerable to climate change. As adaptation measures, both on an international 
and national level, are criticised for the lack of funding and for their inefficiencies, they 
might not suffice to mitigate the effects of climate change on Kiribati whose government has 
foreseen the risk of a total relocation of the population. 
    The topic of climate induced migration is largely discussed among scholars, debating on, 
inter alia, the causes of migration and the number of migrants. Several different solutions are 
proposed to enhance the protection of the category of migrants, facing various challenges, 
and currently there is no solution to the increasingly imminent issue. Establishing state 
responsibility for climate change and claiming a migration scheme as a remedy, could 
thereby be a viable solution to increase the protection of climate induced migrants.  
     The case of Kiribati is based upon two claims. Firstly, the state seeks compensation for 
adaptation measures due to the rise in sea level. Secondly, as a consequence of the need to 
relocate its entire population, the state seeks a migration scheme to do so. The international 
obligations examined in the thesis is the climate change regime, consisting of the United 
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and the Kyoto Protocol, as 
well as, international customary law, in the form of the no-harm rule.  
    In order to establish state responsibility, the breach must firstly be attributable to the state. 
In the present case it can be argued that states have an obligation to ensure that their 
international obligations are adhered to, and that they thereby must legislate and ensure 
compliance with certain emission targets. 
    Secondly, a breach of the primary rules must be established. As climate change is a 
consequences of cumulative actions by multiple states this might pose as a legal hurdle. 
Several different states are examined and possible respondent states are argued to be the ones 
who either have not ratified the Kyoto Protocol, and could be examined under the rules of the 
UNFCCC, or the ones which failed to meet their QUELRO’s which could then be in breach 
of the Kyoto Protocol or under the no-harm rule. 
     Moreover, in order to claim a remedy there must be a chain of causation. Public 
international law proposes different approaches to how causality should be established. The 
specific characteristics of climate change call for an approach where the chain of causation is 
based upon states’ contributions to the adverse effects to the environment.      
     The financial damage occurred through increased adaptation and damage to infrastructure 
could be remedied through compensation. Relocation could be implemented through the 
 2 
purchase of uninhabited land for resettlement and thereby compensated. Thus, if claimed that 
the citizens of the state should be awarded protection in the respondent state, such a claim 
would entail difficulties. However, it is argued that it could be remedied through restitution or 
as a form of compensation. Moreover, if Kiribati was to launch a contentious case at the ICJ, 
several jurisdictional issues would arise and an advisory opinion could thereby be a viable 
solution. 
     It can thereby be concluded that as the protection for climate induced migrants at present 
is insufficient and that there is a need for a larger inclusion. Thus, establishing state 
responsibility for greenhouse gas emissions and claiming remedies would prove difficult, 
mainly due to the issue of causation and the uncertainties regarding the binding force of the 
primary obligations. However, if established, it could form an important precedent in 
negotiations on the protection of climate induced migrants. The thesis thereby highlights the 
many inefficiencies of public international law, of which the most important one is the fact 
that it is based on the consent of states. As climate change is a result of industries, which play 
an important economic purpose, the incentives of states to mitigate the issue can be 
questioned.  
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Sammanfattning 
Konsekvenserna av klimatförändringarna blir allt tydligare och det finns en bred enighet om 
att det kommer att påverka små östater i en så stor utsträckning att det kan tvinga hela 
befolkningar att migrera. Då frågan om klimatbetingad migration till stor är del oreglerad, 
syftar denna uppsats till att undersöka om stater skulle kunna utkräva statsansvar för 
bristande åtgärder för att bromsa växthuseffekten, om ett migrationsprogram skulle kunna 
beviljas som en form av åtgärd, samt om en stat praktiskt skulle kunna utkräva sådant ansvar.  
     Republiken Kiribati, en utvecklingsstat vilken utgörs av ett antal öar i Stilla havet, 
används i uppsatsen som fallstudie i bedömningen. De typografiska förhållandena gör staten 
särskilt utsatt för klimatförändringar. I takt med att anpassningsåtgärder, både på 
internationell och nationell nivå, kritiseras för bristande finansiering och för deras 
ineffektivitet, är det möjligt att de inte räcker för att mildra effekterna av en ökad havsnivå till 
följd av klimatförändringar, något som Kiribatis regering har förutsett, vilket har lett till att 
staten förbereder sig på en total omlokalisering av befolkningen.  
     Doktrin har föreslagit ett flertal olika förslag på hur klimatbetingad migration kan regleras 
och ett flertal olika lösningar finns för att förbättra skyddet för denna kategori av migranter. 
Var förslag står inför ett flertal svåra utmaningar och för närvarande finns det ingen lösning 
på denna alltmer överhängande fråga. Att fastslå statsansvar för växthusgasutsläpp och kräva 
skydd för migranter som en åtgärd skulle därmed kunna vara en potentiell lösning på bristen 
på skydd för klimatbetingad migration.  
     Fallet Kiribati är baserad på två yrkanden. För det första, yrkar staten på ersättning för 
anpassningsåtgärder till följd av den stigande havsnivån. För det andra, som en följd av att 
behöva förflytta hela sin befolkning, eftersträvar staten ett migrationsprogram. De 
internationella förpliktelser som undersökts består i FN: s ramkonvention om 
klimatförändringar (UNFCCC) och det tillhörande Kyotoprotokollet, liksom, internationell 
sedvanerätt i form av no-harm principen.  
     För att fastställa statsansvar måste överträdelsen hänföras till staten. I förevarande fall kan 
det bestå i att stater har en skyldighet att se till att deras internationella åtaganden följs, och 
att de därmed har förpliktelser gällande nationella utsläppsmål.  
     Vidare, måste en överträdelse av primärreglerna kunna fastställas. Då klimatförändringen 
är en konsekvenser av ett flertal staters kumulativa handlingar är fastställandet av en sådan 
överträdelse problematisk. I denna utredning har ett flertal stater undersöks och de mest 
lämpliga svaranden utgörs av de stater som antingen inte har ratificerat Kyotoprotokollet, och 
kan hållas ansvariga för att ha brustit mot sina UNFCCC åtaganden, eller de som inte uppfyllt 
sina QUELRO s och därmed agerat i strid med Kyotoprotokollet, eller under no-harm regeln. 
     Vidare, för att yrka på åtgärder, måste det finnas ett kausalitetssamband mellan skadan och 
den yrkade åtgärden. Doktrin föreslår ett flertal olika metoder för hur kausalitet bör 
fastställas. De specifika egenskaperna av klimatförändringarna kräver ett tillvägagångssätt 
där orsakskedjan bygger på ländernas bidrag till de negativa effekterna på miljön snarare än 
ett direkt orsakssamband.  
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     Den ekonomiska skada som orsakats av behovet av ökade anpassning och skador på 
infrastruktur skulle kunna avhjälpas genom kompensation. Omlokalisering skulle kunna 
genomföras genom köp av obebodd mark för vidarebosättning och i ett sådant fall skulle en 
lämplig åtgärd vara kompensation. Dock är det mer problematiskt om staten yrkar på att dess 
medborgare bör tilldelas skydd i den svarande staten. Detta skulle dock kunna avhjälpas 
genom restitution eller som en form av kompensation. Vidare bör de jurisdiktionsfrågor som 
uppstår om Kiribati drar en stat inför rätta i en internationell domstol, beaktas. Därmed skulle 
ett rådgivande yttrande i ICJ vara en potentiell lösning för Kiribati.  
     Slutsatsen kan därmed dras att skyddet för klimatbetingade migranter för närvarande är 
otillräckligt och att detta bör åtgärdas. Dock vilar statsansvarsreglerna på en grund som inte 
är väl anpassad för klimatförändringars specifika karaktär, främst gällande svårigheterna att 
fastställa ett orsakssamband och oklarheterna gällande UNFCCC:s bindande verkan. Dock 
skulle ett etablerande av statsansvar utverka en viktig prejudicerande effekt i förhandlingarna 
om skyddet av klimatbetingade migranter. Avhandlingen belyser därmed en problematisk 
aspekt i folkrätten, det vill säga, det faktum att den är begränsad till staters samtycke. Då 
klimatförändringen är ett resultat av industrier som fyller en viktig ekonomisk funktion, kan 
staters incitament att bromsa växthusgasutsläppen ifrågasättas. 
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Abbreviations 
AOSIS   Alliance of Small Island States 
AR                                                            Assessment Report 
ASR Draft Articles on Responsibility of State for 
Internationally Wrongful Acts  
CDM    Clean Development Mechanism 
COP  Conference of Parties of the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change  
CSIR   Council for Scientific and Industrial Research  
ENSO   El Niño-Southern Oscillation  
EU   European Union 
GCF   Green Climate Fund  
GDP   Gross domestic product 
GEF   Green Environment Facility  
GHG   Greenhouse gas  
ICJ   International Court of Justice  
ILC   International Law Commission  
IOM   International Organization for Migration 
IPCC   Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change  
KAP   Kiribati Adaptation Programme  
KP Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change  
MBIE    Ministry of Business Innovation and Employment 
NAPCC   National Action Program on Climate Change  
NGO   Non-governmental organisation  
NOU   Norges Offentlige Utredninger 
OECD  Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development 
OPEC   Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries 
PAC     Pacific Access Category 
PCIJ   Permanent Court of International Justice  
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QUELRO  Quantified emission limitation and reduction 
objective 
RSE   Recognised Seasonal Employer 
SC   United Nations Security Council  
SIDS   Small Island Developing States  
SSE    Supplementary Seasonal Employment 
UK United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern 
Ireland 
UN   United Nations 
UNCC   United Nations Compensation Commission 
UNCLOS   United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 
UNFCCC United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change 
UNGA   United Nations General Assembly 
UNRIAA  United Nations Reports of International Arbitral 
Awards 
USA    United States of America  
VCLT    Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 
WWF   World Wide Fund for Nature  
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1 Introduction  
The science […] together with our individual experiences in our own countries provide 
ample evidence that something is terribly wrong. Yet we continue to procrastinate, we 
continue to ignore what the science is telling us and indeed what we are witnessing with our 
own eyes. 
- Anote Tong, President of the Republic of Kiribati  
UNSG Climate Summit, September 2014  
  There is broad agreement among scientist that human activities are contributing to changing 
the concentrations of greenhouse gases (GHG) in the atmosphere, consequently leading to 
fluctuations in the climate.1 In 1992, the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change2 (UNFCCC) was adopted as the first major Convention on the mitigation of climate 
change. However, albeit the two-decade long existence of the Convention, not enough has 
been done to mitigate greenhouse gas emissions and it is unlikely that the process of climate 
change can be brought to a halt.3 As the temperature rises, the oceans expand and the coats of 
ice melt with consequences that may be beyond our comprehension. The world is facing an 
imminent environment threat, likely to have consequences for the social order and economy. 
At worst, hundreds of millions people will be forced to migrate. 4 Thus, it is not the major 
emitters of anthropogenic GHG-emissions, which are likely to suffer most.5 A majority of the 
effects will hit developing states with little capacity to adapt.6 Small island developing states, 
such as Kiribati, plead for the world to recognise that they might be forced to relocate the 
whole population. Albeit, the emissions continue to increase, and climate induced migration 
is unregulated, thereby constituting a protection gap in the international migration and 
refugee protection regime. The question is therefore if the rules on state responsibility can be 
used to fill the legal gap at hand, and if a state could claim a migration scheme through 
adjudication.  
 1.1 Subject and Purpose  
   The discourse on the protection of climate-induced migrants is currently formed within the 
field of international migration law and human rights. However, this thesis seeks to examine 
if the protection could be awarded through the establishment of state responsibility for the 
                                                
1Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), Stocker, F; Qin, D; Plattner, GK; Tignor, MMB et al. 
Climate Change 2014: The Physical Science Basis: Working Group I Contribution to the Fifth Assessment 
Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2014), p. 
53f.  
2 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, 1771 UNTS 107; S. Treaty Doc No. 102-38; U.N. 
Doc. A/AC.237/18 (Part II)/Add.1; 31 ILM 849 (1992).  
3 Solomon, S et al, ‘Irreversible Climate Change due to Carbon Dioxide Emissions’ (2008) 106 Proceedings of 
the National Academy of Sciences 6 pp. 1704-1709, p. 1705.  
4 Myers, N, Environmental Refugees: An Emergent Security Issue (Paper given at the 13th Economic Forum of 
the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), EF.NGO/4/05, 2005), p. 11; Stern, N, The 
Economics of Climate Change: The Stern Review (Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 2006), p. 3. 
5 Burkett, M, ‘Climate Reparations’ (2009) 10 Melbourne Journal of International Law 2 pp. 509-542, p. 510 
6 Ibid, p. 511. 
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failure to mitigate climate change, where facilitating migration would be a form of remedy. 
The examination is done from the perspective of the Republic of Kiribati, a small state 
located on 32 islands in the Pacific Ocean which is argued to be specifically vulnerable to 
climate change. The issue is thereby put in a practical context in order to assess the legal 
avenues available at the international level for vulnerable states. The thesis will seek to 
answer three questions, i.e.: (1) Is there a need for an alternative resolution to the issue of 
climate induced migration? (2) Can state responsibility be established under the international 
climate change framework, under the no-harm rule, or both, and could Kiribati succeed in 
bringing forward such a claim?; and (3) Could a migration scheme and compensation for 
adaptation be claimed as a remedy if state responsibility was established? 
1.2 Scope and Limitations 
   The thesis is based on the climate change regime as well as the no-harm rule. Firstly, as the 
scientific community is reaching increased certainty on the correlation between GHG 
emissions and climate change the thesis will not examine the scientific findings of the 
relationship in-depth. Secondly, other potential legal sources of state responsibility for 
climate change are available, e.g. UNCLOS or environmental customary law in the form of 
e.g. the precautionary principle. The climate change regime and the no-harm rule were 
chosen due to their specific importance to mitigation of GHG-emissions. Furthermore, the 
thesis examines inter-state claims and does therefore not elaborate on individuals’ potential 
claims.  
   Moreover, the thesis only examines developed states, i.e. Annex I7 states, as potential 
respondents. Although developing states are increasingly responsible for the global 
emissions, e.g. China is at present the world’s largest GHG-emitter, the historical emissions, 
which are causing the adverse effects of climate change at present, are largely attributable to 
developed states. It is recognised under the climate change regime, as only developed states 
have mitigation targets under the Kyoto Protocol (KP).8 Furthermore, the discussions of the 
effects climate change concerning SIDS include a broad range of consequences such as the 
disappearance of nation-states, causing statelessness. However, it does not fall within the 
scope of the present thesis.  
                                                
7 Annex I Parties are all the Parties included in Annex I to the Convention (as amended in 1998). This includes 
all the OECD states as well as states with a transitional economy. The following states and intergovernmental 
organisations are Annex I parties: Australia, Austria, Belarus, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, Cyprus, 
Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, European Union, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, 
Ireland, Italy, Japan, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Monaco, the Netherlands, New 
Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russian Federation, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, 
Switzerland, Turkey, Ukraine, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and United States of 
America. 
8 Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Dec. 10, 1997, U.N. Doc 
FCCC/CP/1997/7/Add.1, 37 I.L.M. 22 (1998).  
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 1.3 Method, Materials and Literature Review 
   The thesis uses a legal dogmatic method as a foundation, i.e. to establish lex lata, using 
sources such as Conventions, international customary law as well as judgements and advisory 
opinions from the international dispute mechanisms.9 More specifically, the UNFCCC, KP, 
no-harm rule, as well as, the International Law Commission’s (ILC) Draft Articles on 
Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts10 (ASR). However, in some 
instances national regulations as well as judgements are used to examine how the issues of 
environmentally induced migration is regulated on a domestic level.  
     Literature, reports, books and articles are core components. Reports of the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) have been the central source of 
information on the effects of climate change as these constitute the most recognised sources 
on the topic of climate change. The chapter on migration is largely based on the works of 
McAdam, Biermann and Boas, Docherty and Giannini and Kälin, all notable academic 
scholars and well known within the field of climate induced migration. On the topic of state 
responsibility, ILC’s commentaries and Crawford’s work are essential in the assessment as 
they provide an in-depth commentary to the Articles on State Responsibility. With regards to 
environmental law, the work of Birnie and Boyle is used for an understanding of the basic 
principles of environmental law, whereas Verheyen, Boom and Voigt are of fundamental 
importance for the assessment of state responsibility and climate change.  
     Regarding climate induced migration, a common denominator is the agreement on the lack 
of legal protection for those forced to migrate due to climate change. Several solutions are 
proposed, all with different advantages and disadvantages, and within the scope of the regular 
procedures of the creation of obligations in public international law, e.g. through state-to-
state negotiations and by concluding treaties.  
     Two doctoral theses explore the concept of state responsibility and climate change. 
Verheyen, who completed her work in 2005 and Boom, who published her thesis in 2012. 
Assessments from other perspectives than the climate change regime and the no-harm rule 
are also undertaken. Boom, examines if responsibility could be established under UNCLOS 
and its own mechanism for dispute settlement. Furthermore, Strauss assesses the possibilities 
of climate change adjudication in the ICJ and concludes that albeit such an approach could be 
successful, it is challenged by procedural issues.  
     As noted, the issue of climate induced migration and the topic of state responsibility for 
climate change are considered two separate discourses in international law. As the current 
framework for protection of migrants could prove insufficient, this thesis seeks to examine if 
a different approach, namely through the establishment of state responsibility, could prove a 
more efficient tool for protection. The thesis thereby uses the current research on climate 
change and state responsibility as a stepping stone and merges the two discourses in order to 
examine if state responsibility could function as a viable approach for the protection of 
migrants.  
                                                
9 Sandgren, C, ’Är rättsdogmatiken dogmatisk?’ (2005) 04/05 Tidskrift for Rettsvitenskap, pp. 648-656, p. 649. 
10 International Law Commission, Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, 
November 2001, Supplement No. 10 (A/56/10), chp.IV.E.1.  
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2 Kiribati and Adaptation to Climate 
Change 
2.1 Kiribati  
     The around 100 000 inhabitants of Kiribati live on the 32 atolls11 and coral islands the 
state comprises of. Its land area stretches over 726 km2 and is situated approximately 1.5 
metres above sea level.12 The state is regarded as one of the poorest in the region with a gross 
domestic income of less than $2000 per capita and is largely economically dependent on 
foreign investments in the form of foreign fishing licenses as well as international aid and 
remittances. In the past decades, flows of inhabitants have relocated to the main island, which 
has led to a situation of over-crowding, water pollution and a decline in public health and life 
expectancy.13 
     Low-lying reef islands such as the Kiribati islands are often considered particularly 
vulnerable to climate change.14 According to the IPCC, atoll islands are especially vulnerable 
as the population settlements are coastal and have built-in vulnerabilities by typically being 
extremely low lying, with a lack of soil, surface water, biodiversity and a comparatively 
fragile groundwater system, which increases the potential detriment effects of climate 
change.15 The IPCC mentions pre-existing issues such as ‘severe over-crowding, proliferation 
of informal housing, unplanned settlements, inadequate water supply, poor sanitation and 
solid waste disposal, pollution and conflict over land ownership’16 creating an additional 
vulnerability to climate change.17 The IPCC notes that many of the health effects climate 
change are predicted to cause will be indirect. They will not be directly linked to the climate 
change, but will rather rise out of the increased anxiety and decline in welfare caused by 
property damage, loss of livelihood and threatened communities.18 Furthermore, climate 
change is having an impact on the Pacific Island economies. The economies are vulnerable 
due to the geographical features of the states, and a high dependence on environmental 
                                                
11 Campbell, JR, ‘Climate-Change Migration in the Pacific’ (2014) 43 The Contemporary Pacific 1, pp. 1-28, p. 
4.  
12 Republic of Kiribati, Ministry of Finance, National Statistics Office, Report on the 2010 Kiribati Census of 
Population and Housing – Vol. 1 Basic Information and Tables (2012), p. 31; Australian Government, Bureau 
of Meteorology, ‘Monthly sea levels for Kiribati’ 
<http://www.bom.gov.au/ntc/IDO70060/IDO70060SLI.shtml> accessed 20-12-2014.  
13 Donner, S, ‘Obstacles to climate change adaptation decisions: a case study of sea-level rise and coastal 
protection measures in Kiribati’ (2014) 9 Sustainability Science 3, pp. 331-345, p. 334.  
14 Woodroffe, CD, ‘Reef-island topography and the vulnerability of atolls to sea-level rise’ (2008) 62 Global 
and Planetary Change 1-2, pp. 77-96, p. 77.  
15 Campbell, 2014, p. 4.  
16 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), Nurse, L; Mclean, R et al. ‘Chapter 29. Small Islands’ 
in: Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), Barros, VR; Field, CB; Dokken, DJ; Mastrandrea MD 
et al, Climate Change 2014: Impacts, Adaption and Vulnerability. Part B Regional Aspects. Contribution of 
Working Group II to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
(Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2014), p. 10.   
17 Ibid.   
18 Ibid, p. 12.   
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resources. The states often have a narrow scope of exportable resources and are to a great 
extent dependant on imports of e.g. food and fuel. The size of the islands also lead to an 
economic volatility, as well as high costs for infrastructure, if estimated per capita. The states 
also have an increased vulnerability regarding extreme events such as hurricanes and 
droughts.19  
     Furthermore, the most common impact due to the rise in sea level is shoreline erosion.20 
The consequences are vast, as a rise in sea level may not only lead to shoreline erosion but 
also to salt water intrusion in the freshwater supplies which poses a threat to the population.21 
Moreover, the rise in sea level also poses a real danger of the islands disappearing. Two 
uninhabited islands of Kiribati, Tebua and Bikeman, have already disappeared completely 
due to rising sea levels.22 The dangers of the rising sea-level have been confirmed by the 
President of Kiribati, Anote Tong, who states that due to rising sea-levels and salination, 
Kiribati may become uninhabitable by 2050.23 In the case Teitiota v. MBIE24, which shall be 
further elaborated on below, the High Court of New Zealand noted the vast amount of claims 
by nationals from Kiribati, Tuvalu, Tonga, Bangladesh, and Fiji seeking refugee status based 
on environmental problems attributable to climate change in their home states.25 
2.2 Adaptation to Climate Change  
     In 2010, the parties to the UNFCCC, recognised adaptation to climate change equally as 
important as mitigation under the Cancun Adaptation Framework, adopted as part of the 
Cancun Agreements at the 2010 Climate Conference in Cancun, Mexico. The objective of the 
Framework is to enhance action on adaptation in order to reduce vulnerability and building 
resilience in developing state parties.26 Recognising the parties’ common but differentiated 
responsibilities the Framework stipulates a number of areas in which the parties are invited to 
enhance their measures and take action.27  
                                                
19 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), Nurse, L; Mclean, R et al. ‘Chapter 29. Small Islands’ 
in: Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), Barros, VR; Field, CB; Dokken, DJ; Mastrandrea MD 
et al, Climate Change 2014: Impacts, Adaption and Vulnerability. Part B Regional Aspects. Contribution of 
Working Group II to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
(Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2014), p. 13.   
20 Woodroffe 2008, p. 89.  
21 Donner 2014, p. 333.   
22 Lange, HD, ‘Climate Refugees Require Relocation Assistance: Guaranteeing Adequate Land Assets Through 
Treaties Based on the National Adaptation Programmes of Action’ (2010) 19 Pacific Rim Law & Policy Journal 
3, pp. 613-640, p. 618.  
23 ABC, ‘Kiribati hold national hearings on climate change’ (19 April 2013), 
<http://www.abc.net.au/news/2013-04-19/an-kiribati-national-hearings-on-climate-change/4638512> accessed 
11-10-2014. 
24 Ioane Teitiota v. The Chief Executive of the Ministry of Business Innovation and Employment, CIV-2013-404-
3528 [2013] NZHC 3125, 26 November 2013. 
25 Ibid, para 45.  
26 United Nations Framework Convention for Climate Change, Conference of the Parties, Decisions adopted by 
the Conference of the Parties ((Decision 1/CP.16, FCCC/CP/2010/7/Add.1, 2011), para. 11.  
27 The areas include planning, prioritizing and implementing adaption actions, conduct impact and vulnerability 
assessments, strengthen institutional capacities, building resilience of socio-economic and ecological systems, 
enhancing climate change related disaster risk reduction strategies, take measures with regards to climate 
induced displacement, promote access to technologies, strengthening knowledge systems as well as education 
and improve climate related research. Cf. Ibid, para 14. 
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     Neither the UNFCCC, nor the Kyoto Protocol considers, or addresses, the issue of 
migration in the respective Treaty. The topic of human mobility as a consequence of climate 
change was first recognised by the Conference of Parties of the UNFCCC (COP) on its 16th 
session in 2010. The parties to the UNFCCC were invited to enhance action on adaption by 
undertaking measures to enhance understanding, coordination and cooperation concerning 
climate-induced migration, both in the forms of displacement and planned relocation.28 
However, it is argued that the Convention is not an appropriate forum for the regulation of 
environmental migrants due to its structure and institutions are not designed to protect 
migrants.29  
2.3 Adaptation Funding  
The costs of adaptation between 2010 and 2050 to an approximate average temperature rise 
of 2°C, have been estimated to stand at $70 billion to $100 billion a year.30Article 4(3) 
UNFCCC stipulates an obligation to provide finance resources that are distinct from official 
development assistance. However, the practical importance of the distinction is small seeing 
that few states have met the international development assistance target of 0.7 per cent of 
GDP and due to the fact that very little adaptation funding has actually been distributed.31  
Adaptation funding has only existed for a few years and its main existing sources of funding 
are international donors, channelled through either multilateral institutions or bilateral 
agencies.32 One of the multilateral institutions managing the adaption funds is the Global 
Environment Facility (GEF). Its purpose is to channel the funding for projects relating to the 
main multilateral environmental treaties, of which the UNFCCC is one.33 The funding has 
however not been as successful as planned and the expenditure is described as 
“excruciatingly slow, application procedures are complex and many eligible states are not 
aware of what is on offer or how to access these funds”.34  
     The latest initiative, the Green Climate Fund (GCF), was officially adopted at the 2010 
Conference of Parties (COP) in Cancun, Mexico.35 The GCF is intended to function as the 
                                                
28 Ibid, para. 14(f).  
29 Hodgkinson, D and Young, L, ‘”In the Face of Looming Catastrophe” – A Convention for Climate-Change-
Displaced Persons’ in: Gerrard, MB and Wannier, GE (eds) Threatened Island Nations (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2013), p. 305; Docherty, B and Giannini, T, ‘Confronting a Rising Tide: A Proposal for a 
Convention on Climate Change Refugees’ (2009) 33 Harvard Environmental Law Review 2, pp. 349-404, p. 
358. 
30 World Bank, Economics of adaptation to climate change - Synthesis report (2010), p. 19. 
31 Humphreys, S ’Introduction’ in: Humphreys, S (ed) Human Rights and Climate Change (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2009), p. 17.  
32 World Bank, World Development Report 2010: Development and Climate Change (Washington D.C.: 
Eurospan, 2009), p. 262.  
33 Humphreys 2009, p. 18.  
34 Ibid, p. 17. 
35 United Nations Framework Convention for Climate Change, Conference of the Parties, The Cancun 
Agreements: Outcome of the Work of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-term Cooperative Action under the 
Convention (Decision 1/CP.16, FCCC/CP/2010/7/Add.1, 2011), para. 102. The governing instrument of the 
Fund was albeit adopted at the following COP.  
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operating entity of the financial mechanism of the Convention under article 11 UNFCCC.36 
The objectives of the Fund are to “make a significant and ambitious contribution to the global 
efforts towards attaining the goal set by the international community to combat climate 
change”. 37 The financing of the efforts comes in the form of grants and concessional lending 
as well as through other modalities and instruments.38 The distribution of the funds to the 
GCF are divided between adaptation and mitigation activities.39 As the GCF has not yet 
started to distribute any of its financial resources but is rather in the allocation stage, it is 
difficult to assess the potential success of the fund.  
      The existing climate funds have by the World Bank been described as having “clear limits 
and inefficiencies” and efforts to allocate funding for both mitigation and adaptation are 
described as being “woefully inadequate” as they in 2010 stood at 5 per cent of the amount 
needed.40 Furthermore, the critique points to the fact that the proliferation of funds threatens 
to reduce overall effectiveness of the climate finance. The funds are inefficient vis-à-vis 
allocating funds, an issue that is more prominent the narrower the scope of the fund is. 
However, the most prominent critique of the funding system is that it is dependent on the 
fragmentation and the whims of political and fiscal cycles.41  
2.4 Warsaw Loss and Damage Mechanism  
For the 2008 COP 14 meeting in Poznan, Poland, the Alliance of Small Island States 
(AOSIS) put forward a proposal for a post-2012 agreement on climate change. In light of the 
Bali Action Plan, which requires the parties to enhance action on adaption, the states 
proposed a multi-window mechanism to address loss and damage from climate change 
impacts.42 At the 2013 COP19 in Warsaw the Warsaw Loss and Damage Mechanism was 
adopted. The mechanism is expected to form a part of the post-2020 UN Climate regime and 
has yet to see an ultimate purpose and objective.43 As the Mechanism is in its initialising 
stage and is to be reviewed in 2016 it is difficult to determine its future importance as a tool 
to claim liability. It should be noted that no such function is indicated in the COP19 decision 
and as Doelle notes, the “door is now open on loss & damage, but [...] the discussions are still 
some distance from taking a serious look at the issue of liability for unmitigated climate 
change.”44  
                                                
36 United Nations Framework Convention for Climate Change, Conference of the Parties, Report of the 
Conference of the Parties on its seventeenth session, held in Durban from 28 November to 11 December 2011, 
Launching the Green Climate Fund (Decision 3/CP.17, FCCC/CP/2011/9/Add.1, 2011), paras. 3-4 and 102. 
37United Nations Framework Convention for Climate Change, Conference of the Parties, Governing instrument 
for the Green Climate Fund (Annex 1 to Decision 3/CP.17, FCCC/CP/2011/9/Add.1, 2011), para. 1. 
38 Ibid, para. 54. 
39 Ibid, para. 8.  
40 World Bank, World Development Report 2010: Development and Climate Change (Washington D.C.:  
Eurospan, 2009), p. 257.  
41 Ibid, p. 257. 
42 Alliance of Small Island States, Multi-Window Mechanism to Address Loss and Damage from Climate 
Change Impacts, Proposal to the Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-term Cooperative Action under the 
Convention (2008), p.1-2.  
43Doelle, M ‘The Birth of the Warsaw Loss & Damage Mechanism – Planting a Seed to Grow Ambition’ (2014) 
8 Carbon & Climate Law Review 1 pp. 35-45, p. 35.  
44 Ibid, p. 37.  
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2.5 Kiribati Adaptation Programme  
2.5.1 In situ adaptation  
In 2003, the World Bank, together with the Government of Kiribati initialised an adaptation 
programme (KAP) which aims to reduce Kiribati’s vulnerability to climate change through 
mainstreaming adaption into national economic planning.45 The programme consists of three 
phases; firstly, the preparation phase conducted in 2003-2005 aimed at mainstreaming 
adaptation into the national economic planning, national consultation with the relevant 
stakeholders and identify priority pilot investments to be implemented in the second phase 
which was implemented in 2006-2011.46 The World Bank approved the third phase in 2011, 
running from 2012 to 2016. It aims to improve the resilience of Kiribati to climate change 
with specific focus on freshwater supply and coastal infrastructure.47 The KAP and its 
cooperation with the World Bank and other aid institutions has been criticised both by 
representatives from the Government of Kiribati as well as by scholars. The Permanent 
Representative of the Republic of Kiribati to the United Nations, stated in 2013 in a speech to 
the Second Committee of the United Nations General Assembly, that the delivery of 
international adaptation finance has taken too long. Furthermore, she emphasized that all 
reports and research reach the same conclusion, namely, that all recommended adaptation 
measures remain recommendations due to the lack of resources and adaptation funds.48 
Donner notes three problems concerning the KAP experience. Firstly, it is noted that aid 
competition, i.e. competition for resources available from international donors, have led to 
inefficiencies in the programme. Secondly, due to the small percentage of the population 
having completed higher education, the state’s human resources are strained when these 
persons are often recruited to work on new government projects.49 Thirdly, it is argued that 
implementation and long-term maintenance is limited by the short-term, and volatility of aid 
flows which can also be attributed to the multifaceted nature of these projects that include 
different donors, ministries and consultants.50 
2.5.2 Adaptation through migration  
The Government of Kiribati has taken the position that it would be irresponsible not to 
acknowledge the fact that the islands constituting the Republic of Kiribati might not be able 
                                                
45 World Bank, Kiribati - Adaptation Project. Project Information Document (Report No. PID11622, 2003), p. 
3.  
46 Ibid, p. 4; World Bank, Kiribati - Adaptation Project - Implementation Phase (KAP II), Project Information 
Document (Report No. AB1138, 2004), p. 3. 
47 World Bank, Kiribati - Third Phase of the Adaptation of the Least Developed Country Fund Project, Project 
Information Document (Report No. AB5841, 2010), p. 2.  
48 Her Excellency Makurita Baaro, Permanent Representative of Kiribati to the United Nations, ‘Means of 
Implementation towards the strengthening of SIDS resilience’ (Presentation to the Second Committee of the 
United Nations General Assembly 68th Session, Panel Discussion on Strengthening the resilience of Small 
Island Developing States within the context of sustainable development, 1 November 2013). 
49 Donner 2014, p. 341; This was the case in phase II of the KAP, which faced “severe human resources and 
logistical problems”. Cf. World Bank, Kiribati - Adaptation Project: restructuring. Project Paper (Report No. 
50029, 2009), p. 1. 
50 Donner 2014, p. 341. 
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to sustain life in the future, and has thereby included relocation as the second part of its 
adaptation strategy.51 It consists of two key components. Firstly, it includes creating 
opportunities for those who want to relocate now and in the near future. These migrants are 
anticipated to create expatriate communities that could absorb a larger amount of migrants in 
the longer term. Secondly, the Government of Kiribati aims to raise the qualifications of its 
inhabitants in order to meet the requirements of the Australian and New Zealand labour 
markets with the aim of making the i-Kiribati more attractive as migrants.52 However, it can 
be questioned if such a strategy is viable in practice. Finding employment outside Kiribati is 
not impossible, it is not practicable for the majority of the population, especially concerning 
the status of the global economy where employment opportunities are limited within a state, 
thereby making it unlikely that states will provide jobs without giving preference to its own 
nationals.53  
The relocation can be done by acquiring uninhabited land from another state. Lange argues 
that the purchasing of land through market-based mechanisms is the preferred solution seeing 
that it decreases the risk of territorial conflicts.54 In 2012, the Government of Kiribati entered 
into negotiations with the Republic of Fiji and finalised the acquisition of 20km2 of land from 
Fiji for the sum of $8.77 million in 2014. The land will initially be used to grow crops but the 
President of Kiribati has stated that the aim of the state is to avoid relocating the whole 
population to the acquired land, however he does not exclude the possibility of doing so if it 
became “absolutely necessary”.55 
     In conclusion, as the adaption measures are currently not sufficient to prevent a relocation 
from Kiribati, the population might be forced to relocate. As the Government has stated, such 
a relocation can be part of an adaptation framework but it is not unlikely that many of the I-
Kiribati will be subject to involuntary relocation. The following chapter therefore seeks to 
examine the scope of protection under international law.  
                                                
51 Office of the President, the Republic of Kiribati ‘Relocation’ 
<http://www.climate.gov.ki/category/action/relocation/> accessed 20-10-2014.   
52 Ibid.    
53 Smith, R, ‘Should they stay or should they go? A discourse analysis of factors influencing relocation 
decisions among the outer islands of Tuvalu and Kiribati’ (2013) 1 Journal of New Zealand & Pacific Studies 1, 
pp. 23-39, p. 33; See e.g. New Zealand, mentioned above, and stating a criterion giving preference to nationals 
of New Zealand. Department of Immigration New Zealand, ‘Recognised Seasonal Employers’ 
<http://www.immigration.govt.nz/employers/employ/temp/rse/default.htm> accessed 12-10-2014.  
54 Lange 2010, p. 620-621.  
55 The Guardian, ‘Besieged by the rising tides of climate change, Kiribati buys land in Fiji’ (1 July 2014) 
<http://www.theguardian.com/environment/2014/jul/01/kiribati-climate-change-fiji-vanua-levu> accessed 12-
10-2014.  
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3 Protection of Climate Induced 
Migrants  
     There is no accepted legal definition of climate change refugees and some legal scholars 
make a distinction between different categories of migrants (“environmentally motivated 
migrants, environmentally forced migrants, and environmental refugees”). The distinction is 
drawn between migrants who respond to push and pull factors of which the effects of climate 
change is one, and “environmental refugees” which have no option but to migrate.56 While no 
international definition of environmental migrant exists, the International Organization for 
Migration (IOM) has put forward a working definition and defines environmental migrants 
as:  
 
Environmental migrants are persons or groups of persons who, for reasons of 
sudden or progressive changes in the environment that adversely affect their lives or 
living conditions, are obliged to have to leave their habitual homes, or choose to do 
so, either temporarily or permanently, and who move either within their territory or 
abroad.57  
 
     Migration is a common human adaption strategy, and has for thousands of years been a 
way for humans to escape danger and improve their current situation, movement in response 
to climate change will therefore be likely.58 The complexity of the issue can however not be 
underestimated and legal answers will have to vary depending on the scenarios on to which 
they intend to apply.59 
                                                
56  Burson, B ‘Environmentally Induced Displacement and the 1951 Refugee Convention: Pathways to 
Recognition’ in: Afifi, T and Jäger, J (eds) Environment, Forced Migration and Social Vulnerability (Berlin: 
Springer, 2010), p. 4.  
57 International Organization for Migration, ‘Migration, Climate Change and the Environment’ 
<http://www.iom.int/cms/en/sites/iom/home/what-we-do/migration-and-climate-change/definitional-
issues.html> accessed 11-10-2014. 
58 Barnett and Webber argue that no clear line can be drawn between forced migration and involuntary 
migration in the context of climate change. In the cases of migration to developed states, the migration is 
thought to be more of a voluntary action, exclusive to the inhabitants who can afford it. However, all cases are 
similar in the way that they consist of a risk assessment where an evaluation of the value added and the risks of 
versus the risk of migrating. This further problematizes the question of climate change as a cause of migration 
seeing that it moves the question from a clear involuntary act to an act where there is space for personal 
preference which then naturally includes other factors in the circumstances of life of the person. Cf. Barnett, J 
and Webber, M, Policy Brief: Accommodating Migration to Promote Adaptation to Climate Change (The 
Commission on Climate Change and Development, 2009), p. 6. 
59 Kälin has divided the possible scenarios into five subgroups: (1) sudden-onset disasters; (2) slow-onset 
environmental degradation; (3) ‘sinking’ small islands; (4) areas as high-risk zones; (5) unrest seriously 
disturbing public order, violence or even armed conflict. Each one of the different scenarios will have different 
consequences on migration and will also affect the time, speed and size of movement. Cf. Kälin, W 
‘Conceptualising Climate-Induced Displacement’ in McAdam, J (ed) Climate Change and Displacement – 
Multidisciplinary Perspectives (Portland: Hart Publishing, 2010), p. 85-86. Barnett and Webber create a similar 
type of typology which is divided between internal/international and temporary/permanent migration. C.f. 
Barnett, J and Webber, M 2009; McAdam, J, Climate Change, Forced Migration, and International Law, 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), p. 19. 
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     It is concluded with high confidence that climate change will have “significant 
consequences for migration flows at particular times and places” and the IPCC notes “the 
potential for negative outcomes from migration in such complex, interactive situations is an 
emergent risk of climate change, with the potential to become a key risk”.60 Moreover, sea 
level rise is one of the most likely causes of possibly permanent displacement from low-lying 
coastal areas and in particular Small Island Developing States (SIDS).61 The IPCC has not 
pursued a quantification of an estimated number but recognises that the scope of such 
displacement is contingent upon two factors. Firstly, it depends on government relocation 
strategies and secondly, on the success in which adaptation programmes are implemented.62          
Two different discourses can be seen regarding the number of climate induced migrants. 
Firstly, the maximalist school of thought, consisting of researchers who tend to see migration 
in a negative light,63 predicts a very large number of people being ‘environmental refugees’ 
or otherwise displaced due to climate change. Myers, estimates that the number may be as 
much as two hundred million environmental refugees by 2050, an estimation that has gained 
increased acceptance among scholars and that has been cited in publications from the IPCC.64 
Although, in some instances the estimations rise up to a billion migrants.65 The minimalist 
school of thought, argues that the decision to migrate cannot be conferred to a single factor 
but rather to multiple causes of which climate change will be one and that it is difficult to 
estimate the number of climate change induced migrants.66 
     Currently, the majority of migrants migrate within the borders of the state and fall under 
the definition of ‘internally displaced’ and that this will be the case regarding migrants which 
move in response to climate change.67 However, in cases for the Pacific Islands, including 
Kiribati, this might not be possible seeing that there is a threat to the existence of the state 
and due to the fact that the situation of over-crowding is already severe. Half of the state’s 
population lives on the main land of Tarawa, a number that is increasing as more people 
                                                
60 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), Oppenheimer, M; Campos, M; Warren, R et al. ‘Chapter 
19. Emergent Risks and Key Vulnerabilities’ in: Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), Barros, 
VR; Field, CB; Dokken, DJ; Mastrandrea MD et al, Climate Change 2014: Impacts, Adaptation, and 
Vulnerability. Part A: Global and Sectoral Aspects. Contribution of Working Group II to the Fifth Assessment 
Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2014), p. 
1060.  
61 Ibid; Docherty, B and Giannini, T 2009, p. 355. 
62 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), Oppenheimer, M; Campos, M; Warren, R et al. ‘Chapter 
19. Emergent Risks and Key Vulnerabilities’ in: Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), Barros, 
VR; Field, CB; Dokken, DJ; Mastrandrea MD et al, Climate Change 2014: Impacts, Adaptation, and 
Vulnerability. Part A: Global and Sectoral Aspects. Contribution of Working Group II to the Fifth Assessment 
Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2014), p. 
14. 
63 Campbell, JR, ‘Climate-Change Migration in the Pacific’ (2014) 43 The Contemporary Pacific 1, pp. 1-28, p. 
1.  
64 Myers, N, Environmental Refugees: An Emergent Security Issue (Paper given at the 13th Economic Forum of 
the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), EF.NGO/4/05, 2005), p. 1; Stern, N, The 
Economics of Climate Change: The Stern Review (Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 2006), p. 3. 
65 Campbell, JR, ‘Climate-Change Migration in the Pacific’ (2014) 43 The Contemporary Pacific 1, pp. 1-28, p. 
1. 
66 Kälin, W ‘Conceptualising Climate-Induced Displacement’ in McAdam, J (ed) Climate Change and 
Displacement – Multidisciplinary Perspectives (Portland: Hart Publishing, 2010), p. 81.  
67 McAdam, J ‘Swimming Against the Tide: Why a Climate Change Displacement Treaty is Not the Answer’ 
(2011) 23 International Journal of Refugee Law 1, pp. 2-27, p. 8.  
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move from the remote islands of the state. This has caused a population density, which in 
2011 was higher than in Hong Kong.68     
3.1 Current Standpoints in International Law     
3.1.1 Inclusion in the 1951 Refugee Convention  
     Firstly, it is important to note that the discussion on the applicability of the Refugee 
Convention69 is only revolving the application on so called ‘environmental refugees’. As 
noted environmentally induced migration may be conducted on a voluntary basis on which 
the Convention would certainly not apply. 
     The purpose of the protection of refugees is to serve as a complementary protection to the 
protection an individual should receive from the state of which he or she is a national. In 
cases where the state fails to protect its nationals, they are entitled to invoke rights of 
protection in any other state party to the Convention.70 
     The Refugee Convention is not applicable to climate refugees for a number of reasons. 
Firstly, the consequences of climate or other environmental factors are not generally 
considered ‘persecution’ within the meaning of the provision seeing that the serious 
violations of human rights are not perpetrated by a concrete identifiable entity, i.e. by the 
deliberate policy or practice by a government or by non-state entities such as rebel groups. 
     Secondly, the fear of persecution must be for reasons relating to one of the five convention 
grounds (race, nationality, religion, and membership of a particular social group or political 
opinion). The effects of climate change do not discriminate between any of the identified 
groups specified in the Refugee Convention.71  
     Moreover, the effects of climate change are argued to collide with “issues such as poverty, 
inequality, discriminatory modes of government, and human rights violations”, thereby 
making it difficult to discriminate between the real cause of migration.72 McAdam argues that 
such an approach would likely contribute to the misunderstanding of the likely patters, 
timescale and nature of climate induced migration and that it could therefore be contra 
productive to the objectives it seeks to protect.73 Furthermore it is argued that the term 
‘refugee’ entails a specific legal meaning which could be uncomfortably stretched or even 
undermine the refugee protection regime.74  
                                                
68 Ibid, p. 9.  
69 UN General Assembly, Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, 28 July 1951, United Nations, Treaty 
Series, vol. 189, p. 137. 
70 Hathaway, J, The Rights of Refugees under International Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2005), p. 4-5.  
71 Klein Solomon, M and Warner, K, ‘Protection of Persons Displaced as a Result of Climate Change: Existing 
Tools and Emerging Frameworks’ in Gerrard, MB and Wannier, GE (eds) Threatened Island Nations 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), p. 256.  
72 Burson, B ‘Environmentally Induced Displacement and the 1951 Refugee Convention: Pathways to 
Recognition’ in: Afifi, T and Jäger, J (eds) Environment, Forced Migration and Social Vulnerability (Berlin: 
Springer, 2010), p. 6.  
73 McAdam, J, Climate Change, Forced Migration, and International Law, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2012), p. 40.  
74  Klein Solomon, M and Warner, K 2013, p. 257.  
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     The applicability of the Refugee Convention was examined in the case Teitiota v. MBIE75 
by the High Court of New Zealand. The applicant, a Kiribati national, had lived unlawfully in 
New Zealand for six years and claimed that he could not return to Kiribati due to the fact that 
climate change would make Kiribati uninhabitable due to rising sea-levels and environmental 
degradation.76 The Court rejected the applicants claim and stated that if such a claim was 
approved it would broaden the scope of the Refugee Convention to millions of people 
suffering under the hardships of natural disasters, and that it was not for the Court to broaden 
the Convention to such an extent.77 
     Furthermore, the label of “refugees” is rejected by Kiribatian officials. As cited in 
McAdam, the President of Kiribati explains that by labelling people as refugees, a stigma is 
put on the victims rather than on the offenders. The President explains:  
 
We don’t want to lose our dignity. We’re sacrificing much by being displaced, in 
any case. So we don’t want to lose that, whatever dignity is left. So the last thing we 
want to be called is ‘refugee’. We’re going to be given as a matter of right 
something that we deserve, because they’ve taken away what we have.78  
3.1.2 Amending the Refugee Convention 
     One option to regulate climate induced migration has been to bringing persons who 
relocate due to environmental degradation within the scope of the current refugee protection 
by amending the Refugee Convention to include such persons. This was suggested by the 
Government of the Maldives who called for an amendment of the Refugee Convention.79 
Biermann and Boas question the political feasibility of such an amendment by arguing that it 
is unlikely seeing that industrialised states already press to seek restrictive interpretations of 
the Convention and that it thereby is highly unlikely that they would agree to extend the 
protection further.80 Additionally, climate induced migration differs from the current 
definition of a refugee to such an extent and for reasons that does not make the UNHCR an 
ideal body to deal with climate induced migrants. It is rather an issue of development, which 
requires “large-scale, long-term planned resettlement programs for groups of affected 
people”81, thereby making it an issue falling within the competence of the United Nations 
Development Programme (UNDP) or the World Bank.82 Furthermore, some scholars, as in 
the case with an inclusion of the term in the Refugee Convention, fear that the inclusion 
would devaluate the current protection for refugees as it would broaden the scope of the 
                                                
75 Ioane Teitiota v. The Chief Executive of the Ministry of Business Innovation and Employment, CIV-2013-404-
3528 [2013] NZHC 3125, 26 November 2013.  
76 Ibid, para. 15.  
77 Ibid, para. 51.  
78 McAdam, J 2012, p. 41. The quote stems from an interview by McAdam with President Anote Tong (Tarawa, 
Kiribati, May 2009).  
79 Republic of the Maldives, Ministry of Environment, Energy and Water, Report on the First Meeting on 
Protocol on Environmental Refugees: Recognition of Environmental Refugees in the 1951 Convention and 1967 
Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees (2006).  
80 Biermann, F and Boas, I, ‘Protecting Climate Refugees: The Case for a Global Protocol’ (2008) November-
December, Environment, p. 8.  
81 Ibid.  
82 Ibid.   
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protection to millions and such a proposal would thereby entail more disadvantages than 
possible advantages.83  
3.1.3 New Convention  
     Some academics argue that a new Convention, awarding protection to climate refugees is 
the preferred solution.84 A new Convention could function either as an independent treaty or 
as a protocol to the Refugee Convention or the UNFCCC. The latter is though dismissed by 
Docherty and Giannini who argue that neither the Refugee Convention’s nor the UNFCCC’s 
object and purpose would fit well with the required essential characteristics of a treaty 
regulating climate refugees. Therefore, an independent treaty would, according to Docherty 
and Giannini, be the preferred option.85 The opinion is concurred by Hodginson et al. who 
proposes that such a Convention should not only include trans-border migration, but also 
internal displacement.86 
     However, some scholars also oppose the idea of a new treaty. McAdam puts forward three 
arguments for why a treaty would not serve the best solution to climate-induced migration.87 
Firstly, in the case of sea-level rise and the threat to the Pacific Islands, the threat is in the 
form of slow-onset climate processes that do not go hand in hand with the existing 
framework of refugee law. As refugee law requires a certain seriousness of harm, the timing 
in when the slow process amounts to fulfilling the criterion would be vital.88 Secondly, it 
would be impossible to differentiate between the previously mentioned conceptual issues, i.e. 
between forced migration due to climate change and those who have chosen to relocate due 
to other push-and-pull factors. McAdam and Williams thereby argues that addressing one of 
the causal factors in a multicausal situation, would be ambiguous.89 Thirdly, and perhaps 
most importantly, McAdam notes the political obstacles to the drafting of a new treaty. As 
McAdam puts it: “states presently lack the political will to negotiate a new instrument 
requiring them to provide international protection to additional groups of people.”90 The 
argument is similar to the one of Biermann and Boas regarding the amendment of the 
Refugee Convention.91 Moreover, Williams argues that the issue of climate change is 
controversial and that it is unlikely that governments would make binding commitments 
concerning climate-induced migration seeing as it could indicate state accepting 
responsibility for climate change.  In conclusion, as a new convention would be preferred in 
theory, it is unlikely that it would be realised in practice.92   
                                                
83 Williams, A ‘Turning the tide: Recognizing Climate Refugees in International Law’ (2008) 30 Law and 
Policy 4, pp. 502-529, p. 509; Appave, G ‘Emerging issues in international migration’ in: Opeskin, B, 
Perruchoud, R and Redpath-Cross, J (eds) Foundations of International Migration Law (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2012), p. 407. 
84 Hodgkinson, D and Young, L 2013. 
85 Docherty, B and Giannini, T, 2009, p. 350.  
86 Hodgkinson, D and Young, L 2013, p. 308. 
87 McAdam, J 2011, p. 7.  
88 Ibid, p. 8-12.  
89 Ibid, p. 15-16; Williams, A 2008, p. 517. 
90 McAdam, J 2011, p. 12-15. 
91 Biermann, F and Boas, I 2008, p. 8.  
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3.1.4 Bilateral and National Arrangements  
    Williams calls for regional cooperation on climate induced migration under the auspices of 
the UNFCCC. Williams argues that in the recent discourse on complementary protection 
within the field of refugee law, regional agreements could offer protection for climate-
induced migrants. Williams refers to practices of complementary protection in, inter alia, the 
European Union (EU) but also notes that such agreements have been adopted based on 
diluted decisions and at the lowest common level.93 It is suggested that a regional 
arrangement, functioning under the auspices of the UNFCCC could develop displacement 
agreements and action plans that would best reflect individual regional capacities.94  
     Some states have offered complementary protection based on environmental 
degradation.95        
Regarding the states in the Pacific region, neither the immigration regulations of Australia 
nor New Zealand has a protection provision for persons seeking protection due to 
environmental disasters. The newly elected government in Australia has pledged to reduce 
migration intakes and the inclusion of such a provision in the near future is thereby 
unlikely.96 New Zealand has adopted an immigration policy which is more positive towards 
immigrant from the Pacific region. Under New Zealand’s Pacific Access Category (PAC) the 
State awards residence to 75 inhabitants from Kiribati each year to be chosen by ballot. The 
persons must be between 18-45 years old and be able to prove an offer of employment in 
New Zealand, fulfil minimum income requirements, undergo health check, have no history of 
illegal entrances, and have an acceptable level of spoken and written English.97 Furthermore, 
in 2007 the Recognized Seasonal Employer policy was launched by the New Zealand 
                                                
93 Williams, A 2008, p. 513.  
94 Ibid, p. 521. 
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International Migration (International Organization for Migration, Background Paper WMR, 2010), p. 8-9; 
Migration Policy Institute ‘Temporary Protection Status in the United States: A Grant of Humanitarian Relief 
that is Less than Permanent’ 2 July 2014,  <http://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/temporary-protected-status-
united-states-grant-humanitarian-relief-less-permanent> accessed 12-10-2014.  
96 Al Jazeera, ‘Australia’s new PM talks tough on foreign aid and immigration’ (8 September 2013) 
<http://america.aljazeera.com/articles/2013/9/8/australia-s-new-primeministervowstocutforeignaid.html> 
accessed 12-10-2014.  
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government, which entered into inter-agency understandings with six Pacific states, including 
Kiribati.98 The visas are issued for a specific period and require the immigrant to have 
secured an employment in New Zealand.99 The quota of places stands at 8000 persons 
eligible to apply per year and the employments can only be awarded in cases where the 
employer has failed to find a resident or citizen of New Zealand to employ.100 Nevertheless, 
the common denominator concerning the immigration policies is the requirement of already 
having an employment offer that does limit the scope of possible applicants and thereby 
makes both programmes based primarily on employment and not environmental factors.101 
     It can therefore be concluded that at current the protection of climate induced migrants is 
insufficient and that states are seemingly reluctant to award protection to the category of 
migrants in the near future. Thus, as the climate is changing there is an imminent need to 
expand the protection. The following chapter thereby seeks to examine if the establishment of 
state responsibility could function as a method of action.   
                                                
98 Department of Labour of New Zealand and the Ministry of Labour and Human Resource Development of the 
Republic of Kiribati, Inter-Agency Understanding between the Department of Labour of New Zealand and the 
Ministry of Labour and Human Resource Development of the Republic of Kiribati in support of New Zealand’s 
Recognised Seasonal Employer Work Policy, (2007).  
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4 Accountability and Climate 
Change 
     In the same pace as the efforts of adopting decisions have failed to mitigate climate 
change, developing states have called for measures to claim climate change accountability. 
Twenty years have passed since the UN General Assembly initiated negotiations on climate 
change and we are yet to see a legally binding instrument with overarching legal obligations 
that limit GHG-emissions or addresses the consequences of climate change.102 Furthermore, 
the US and China have both indicated that neither state would accept a treaty regime that 
includes penalties for non-compliance with mitigation commitments.103  
     The threat of demanding climate change liability through litigation does however have a 
realistic potential to be examined. In 2002, the state of Tuvalu threatened to sue both the 
United States of America as well as Australia in the International Court of Justice (ICJ) for 
the states’ refusal to sign the Kyoto Protocol as well as for their contributions to global 
climate change.104 Furthermore, in September 2011, Palau and the Republic of the Marshall 
Islands announced their decision to seek and Advisory Opinion from the ICJ on climate 
change.105 Such an opinion can however only be asked by the United Nations General 
Assembly in accordance with Article 96 of the UN Charter.106 In the past years, the process to 
request an Advisory Opinion has thus slowed down as former President of the state stepped 
down. Moreover, the threat of an Advisory Opinion was faced with diplomatic pressure from 
large emitters such as the United States of America, which lead to the fear that the state 
would withdraw its foreign aid to Palau. From there on, any significant progress in the 
process has not been reached.107 The main goal of these cases might not be to seek concrete 
remedies or a binding verdict for one state, but rather to provide both an incentive for states at 
the negotiating table as well as an alternation of the dynamics of the interstate negotiations. A 
ruling would not only make the mitigation of GHG-emissions a moral claim based on the 
protection of the planet and its inhabitants, but a claim supported by the weight of a respected 
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legal authority with a high normative value. Doing so beyond the UNFCCC but still within 
the UN system could circumvent the issues visible already at the UNFCCC discussions, i.e. 
reaching consensus among 200 different states with different interests and objectives.108  
4.1 State Responsibility and Climate Change  
     The International Law Commission’s Articles on Responsibility of States for 
Internationally Wrongful Acts109 (ASR) stipulates a division between primary and secondary 
rules of state responsibility. The primary rules relate to the content and duration of the state 
responsibilities as determined by a treaty or by customary law. The secondary rules on the 
other hand, as articulated in ASR, determine the consequences of a breach of the applicable 
primary obligation.110 The examination of climate change liability does therefore naturally 
start with the obligations entailed in climate change and environmental law.  
     International law distinguishes between lex generalis and lex specialis, in cases where two 
different regulations are applicable to the same factual circumstance, giving primacy to the 
latter in cases where it regulates a specific subject matter.111 In the present case, it could be 
discussed if the rules of the Refugee Convention constitute lex specialis and thereby 
precludes rewarding protection to migrants based on state responsibility under the climate 
change regime. In relation to the various provisions regulating the principle of non-
refoulement, McAdam argues that the Refugee Convention functions as a lex specialis in all 
cases regarding complementary protection of refugees, no matter the source of protection and 
no matter whether the migrant falls under the scope of the Convention.112 Applied in the 
present case, such an approach would imply that the Refugee Convention has primacy with 
regards to the protection of climate induced migrants. Thus, the approach is not uncontested. 
Hathaway argues that such a conclusion would constitute a wrongful interpretation of lex 
specialis as the norm presupposes a conflict of rules. In cases where both norms can be 
applied without the one infringing the other, the principle does not apply.113 As concluded, 
the Refugee Convention is not considered applicable to climate induced migrants. An 
examination of state responsibility and if the protection of migrants could be awarded as a 
remedy is thereby not precluded by the Convention.  
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     Furthermore, it is important to note that the existence of a specified treaty law could result 
in an exclusion of more general customary law. In international law, it is referred to as a 
“self-contained regime”. If the UNFCCC together with the Kyoto Protocol was to be 
regarded as a self-contained regime, it would exclude the applicability of the rules on state 
responsibility seeing that the regime in itself stipulated both the primary and secondary 
obligations in the provisions.114 Nevertheless, currently that is not the case. The UNFCCC 
and its Protocol does not contain clear primary obligations, which in themselves could be 
sufficient to exclude general international law, neither do they stipulate secondary 
obligations.115 Furthermore, it has been rejected by several state parties to the Convention 
who at the ratification made declarations specifically stating that the Convention “shall in no 
way constitute a renunciation of any rights under international law concerning state 
responsibility for the adverse effects of climate change”.116 Thus, the legal effect of such 
declarations are not clarified by general principles.117 The declarations read in conjunction 
with the lack of clarity of the primary obligations as well as the non-existence of secondary 
obligations applicable to damages caused by states to the territory of other states indicate that 
the provisions on state responsibility are not precluded.  
4.2 Primary Obligations  
     The second condition in order to determine the existence of an internationally wrongful 
act of the state is the breach of an international obligation of that state. It includes both treaty 
and non-treaty obligations and has been considered equivalent as to the state’s conduct being 
contrary to the rights of other states.118 In order to determine the breach of an international 
obligation an assessment of the obligations needs to be undertaken.  
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4.2.1 UNFCCC 
     Initiated by the United Nations General Assembly in 1990 and adopted at the Rio 
Conference in 1992, the UNFCCC currently has 195 parties.119 The text of the Convention 
mirrors its intention to draw upon universal participation.120 Some developed states had 
already undertaken voluntary commitments121 whereas other states such as the US, refused to 
make commitments to quantified targets.  The divisions between the major groups of states 
participating in the negotiations are of importance for the assessment and interpretation of the 
Convention.122 The negotiations resulted in a framework agreement which was supposed to 
serve the purpose of establishing a process for reaching further agreements on measures 
tackling climate change.123 The guiding principle is one of “common but differentiated 
responsibilities and respective capacities”.124 Yet, the parties to the Convention can be argued 
to have left the Convention with a significant amount of discretion regarding specific rights 
and obligations.125 
4.2.1.1 Objectives and Commitments  
     The ultimate objective of the Convention, as specified in its second article, is to achieve a 
stabilisation of greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent 
dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system. Furthermore, the article 
stipulates that such a level should be achieved within a time frame sufficient to allow 
ecosystems to adapt naturally to climate change, without further specifying the period.126 An 
assessment of “dangerous anthropogenic interference” requires value judgments, where 
science plays an important role. Currently, the scientific community argues that limiting a 
global temperature increase relative to pre-industrial times to below 2°C is necessary to meet 
the objective.127 The limit of 2°C was in the IPCC Assessment Report (AR) in 2007 argued to 
                                                
119 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change ‘Background on the UNFCCC: The international 
response to climate change’ <http://unfccc.int/essential_background/items/6031.php> accessed 03-12-2014.  
120 This includes meeting the needs of both members of AOSIS, which were negotiating with the fear of 
representing states that might disappear, as well as the members of the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting 
Countries (OPEC), whose income could suffer serious damage in the case the Convention would lead to a 
decreased fuel demand. Moreover, larger developing states such as China, Brazil and India strived for a 
Convention which would not put bounds to their own economic progress and urged developed states to take the 
lead. Neither the members of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) could 
agree upon the measures which needed to be taken in order to address climate change. Cf. Birnie, P, Boyle, A 
and Redgewell, C, International Law & the Environment (3rd ed), (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), p. 
357, p. 356-357. 
121 Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, New Zealand, 
Norway, Sweden, Switzerland and the United Kingdom.  
122 Birnie, P, Boyle, A and Redgewell, C 2009, p. 356-357. 
123 Ibid, p. 357.  
124 The principle consists of three components. Firstly, it recognizes the common responsibility for all states to 
protect the global environment and the importance of preventing global climate change through global 
cooperation. Secondly, it recognizes the fact that the largest share of historical emissions are attributable to 
developed states and that these thereby have a larger financial responsibility towards the mitigation of climate 
change. Thirdly, the principle adheres to the different capabilities of states and thereby requires them to see that 
wealthier and more capable states take a larger financial responsibility. Cf. Articles 3(1) and 4(1) UNFCCC. 
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be “an upper limit beyond which the risks of grave damage to ecosystems, and of non-linear 
responses, are expected to increase rapidly”.128 Acknowledged by governments, which at 
various summits recognised the 2°C target, it is the guiding position in the post-2015 
negotiations.129  
     The objective reflects the concern that the planet’s ecosystem is threatened by increased 
anthropogenic GHG-emissions. The objective has been interpreted in several different ways. 
Birnie et al stressed that the objective is to stabilise the emissions rather than reversing them 
and that the wording of the article leads to the assumption that the parties agreed to the fact 
that some degree of climate change would be inevitable and tolerable as long as the process 
was slow enough to allow for natural adaption.130 On the other hand, academics argue that the 
Convention shall be interpreted as meaning that the there is a duty of prevention of climate 
change enshrined in the objectives.131 The IPCC notes that the mere stabilisation of the 
current levels of anthropogenic GHG-emissions would not suffice in order to keep the current 
level of GHG concentrations in the atmosphere. As GHGs remain in the atmosphere for, on 
average, a century or more, a rapid decrease in emissions is needed to stabilise current levels 
to a level that would prevent an average temperature rise of 2°C.132 According to the IPCC, a 
decrease in anthropogenic GHG-emissions with 40 to 70 per cent from the 2010 levels needs 
to be met by the year 2050, in order to not exceed the targeted temperature rise,.133 In 
conclusion, an interpretation of the wording of the Article indicates that the latter 
interpretation is correct seeing that the word stabilise refers to a certain level.  
     Article 3 sets out a number of guiding principles. These include references to the climate 
system as an intergenerational benefit, the principle of common but differentiated 
responsibilities, the specific needs and vulnerabilities of developing states which would be 
particularly vulnerable to the effects of climate change, the precautionary principle, the right 
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of all to sustainable development and the promotion of a supportive and open international 
economic system.134 
     Article 4 UNFCCC lays down certain commitments which the parties to the Convention, 
taking into account their common but differentiated responsibilities, shall undertake. Article 
4(2) UNFCCC is of particular value in the context. The provision is directed towards 
developed and Annex I states, and obliges them to, inter alia, “[…] adopt national policies 
and take corresponding measures on the mitigation of climate change, by limiting its 
anthropogenic emissions of greenhouse gases […]”.135 Furthermore, the Article stipulates a 
commitment of Annex I parties to the aim of reducing their levels of GHG-emissions to 
earlier levels by the year 2000.136  In paragraph (b) of the Article, the parties’ 1990 levels are 
mentioned as a target to which the parties should aim to reduce their emissions to the levels 
of GHG-emissions they emitted before 1990.137 Seen together, these two paragraphs could 
constitute an obligation to reduce the levels of GHG-emissions to the 1990 levels, before the 
year 2000. However, this is contested by Boom who argues that it would lead to “an 
inappropriate interpretation of the text”138 as the language of the Articles does not clearly 
provide that they should be read together.139 Secondly, the negotiating history of the 
UNFCCC indicates that although efforts were made to create specific targets and time-limit 
for the implementation, such efforts were unsuccessful. Thirdly, as close to all parties to the 
UNFCCC are parties to the Kyoto Protocol, the commitment period was established to 2008-
2012, which is inconsistent with Article 4.2(a)-(b) of the UNFCCC. This could indicate that 
the latter provision was not intended to function as a specific target with a time-limit.140  
     Voigt argues that a teleological interpretation of the Article establishes an obligation of 
conduct to reverse the increasing GHG-emissions. This could especially be the case when the 
Article is read in conjunction with Article 2 of the Convention. When interpreted in such a 
way both Voigt and Verheyen argue that the two articles in conjunction may create a binding 
obligation.141 In the interpretative declarations to the UNFCCC, the states have different 
approaches to the matter and no coherent approach can be derived.142 Moreover, such an 
interpretation has been revoked e.g. by President Bush’s domestic policy advisor who stated 
that the wording of the Convention cannot in any way constitute legally binding 
obligations.143 In conclusion, there are arguments both for and against the binding effect of 
the provision. Nevertheless, there is indeed scope to argue the binding effect of the 
provisions.  
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4.2.1.1.1 Good faith and Article 18 VCLT 
     The principle of good faith is deeply enshrined in international law.144 Furthermore, 
Article 18 VCLT stipulates that states have an obligation to refrain from acts which would 
defeat the objective and purpose of a Treaty. The Article constitutes international customary 
law and does thereby apply to states, which have not ratified the VCLT.145 In the present 
case, the objective of the Convention is, as mentioned, to stabilise anthropogenic GHG-
emissions at a level preventing dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate.146 
Furthermore, Article 4 (2) UNFCCC imposes specific commitments on Annex I parties to 
“commit themselves specifically” to such stabilisation, and recognizes that the mitigation of 
such emissions are necessary to reach the objective of the Convention. Seen together, the duty 
to prevent and Annex I parties specific commitments under Article 4 of the Convention, as 
well as the recognition that a reduction of emissions is necessary to fulfil the Convention’s 
objectives. This does imply that there is an obligation of conduct to reverse the trend of 
increasing GHG-emissions in order to fulfil the Convention’s object and purpose, and that 
measures contrary to the obligation are measures, which would breach the principle of good 
faith as well as the obligations stipulated in Article 18 VCLT.147  
4.2.2 The Kyoto Protocol  
     In 1995 at the first COP in Berlin, the parties to the Convention agreed upon the Berlin 
Mandate148. After reviewing Article 4(2) UNFCCC and deeming the subparagraph of the 
Article inadequate to fulfil the objectives of the UNFCCC, the parties decided on enabling a 
process in order to take action post 2000 and strengthen the commitments enshrined in the 
Article through the adoption of a protocol.149 The Mandate specified that the new protocol 
would entail stronger policies and measures for developed parties and set quantified emission 
limits and removal of sinks, within a specific timescale.150  
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     The negotiations leading up to what finally became the Kyoto Protocol, started out on 
similar positions as to the UNFCCC.151 However, science on the topic had reached greater 
certainty, and for the first time a majority of developing states agreed to the fact that climate 
change was a severe issue. The EU, which was the only group whose GHG-emissions had 
stabilised since the Rio Conference, remained the most proactive. The United States of 
America, on the other hand, was continuously cautious and was specifically reluctant 
regarding creating commitments to reduction levels below the 1990 levels.152  
     The Protocol was adopted in 1997 yet it could not enter into force due to rules regulating 
its entry into force, until 16 February 2005.153 The Protocol fulfils most of the objectives set 
out in the Mandate and its most notable feature was its quantified emissions limitation and 
reduction obligations (QUELRO) imposed on industrialised states. The restrictions are set out 
in Article 3(1) of the Protocol and obliges the parties included in Annex I to, jointly or 
individually, ensure that they do not exceed the awarded amount of the GHG-emissions listed 
in Annex A to the Protocol within the commitment period of 2008-2012. The allowed 
emissions were counted from a specific base year, which in the case of most states was 
1990.154 The general reduction target was a minimum of five per cent.155 The individual 
limits were set based on the individual states’ circumstances, e.g. ability to reduce emissions, 
access to clean technology and use of energy. However all parties listed in Annex I had to 
show demonstrable progress by 2005 in achieving their commitments.156  
     Apart from its binding commitments, the Protocol contains various flexible mechanisms 
that aid the implementation of the obligations. For instance, the Clean Development 
Mechanism (CDM) allows Annex I parties to instigate projects in developing states reducing 
anthropogenic GHG-emissions. The reductions generated from such projects can in turn be 
used by the Annex I party to help meet its own GHG-emission target.157  
4.2.3 The No-Harm Rule  
     One of the core principles in environmental law is the no-harm rule. It was first elaborated 
on in the Trail Smelter case in 1935 where the arbitration tribunal ruled that:  
 
[N]o State has the right to use or permit the use of its territory in such a manner as 
to cause injury by fumes in or to the territory of another or the properties or persons 
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therein, when the case is of serious consequence and the injury is established by 
clear and convincing evidence.158  
 
     The principle has thereafter been reinstated in several international documents relating to 
international environmental law, among others, in the normative Principle 21 of the 
Stockholm Declaration159 from 1972 and Principle 2 in the Rio Declaration160 from 1992, in 
the preamble to the UNFCCC161, as well as by international courts.162 It reflects the view that 
although states are sovereign within their own territorial jurisdiction, the sovereignty is 
narrowed by the limitation that such sovereignty must be exercised without violating the 
rights of other states.  
     The no-harm rule has been elaborated on in the ILC’s Draft Articles on Prevention of 
Transboundary Harm from Hazardous Activities.163 The Articles can be used as a recent tool 
to interpret international customary law seeing that it codifies core international 
environmental principles.164 The core duties of the no-harm rule is the obligation of the state 
to both prevent damage and minimise risk which thereby creates obligations for states before 
the harm has occurred. The rule is not contingent upon the intent of states, and neither are all 
acts, e.g. all GHG-emissions, subject of the rule. Rather, the rule stipulates that only certain 
harm where states have not acted within their obliged standard of care, are in breach of the 
no-harm rule.165 
4.2.3.1 Standard of care  
     In order to determine the scope of the state’s duty to control regarding the no-harm rule, 
the standard of care needs to be examined to evaluate the necessary conduct of the state. The 
discussions on which standard should be adhered to are continuous. Some legal scholars 
argue that there is a strict liability for transboundary harm whereas others argue that the 
applicable standard is one of due diligence. In the work of the ILC, the obligation of due 
diligence rather than strict liability prevails, and the Commission conceptualised the standard 
as manifested in: 
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[R]easonable efforts by a State to inform itself of factual and legal components that 
relate foreseeably to a contemplated procedure and to take appropriate measures, in 
timely fashion, to address them.166 
 
     Moreover, the Commission exemplifies a number of unilateral measures the states are 
obliged to undertake in order to prevent or minimise the risk of transboundary harm, inter 
alia, by formulating and implementing policies designed to prevent or minimise the risk of 
such harm. Furthermore, it should be noted that the standard of care, i.e. the due diligence 
obligation, varies depending on the risk of harm at hand. Activities considered more 
hazardous require a higher standard of care.167  
      Three key criteria are used to determine compliance with due diligence: (1) an 
opportunity to act; (2) foreseeability of harm; and (3) proportionality of measures taken to 
prevent harm or minimise risk.168  
     In the present case, the latest IPCC reports have continuously showed that anthropogenic 
GHG-emissions contribute to climate change. In line with its due diligence obligations every 
state is obliged to mitigate its GHG-emissions, i.e. every state is obliged to take effective 
measures on the basis of the best available technologies in order to reduce its emissions in 
order to fulfil the first criterion.169 The second criterion, whether the “state should have 
known”, does not stipulate that the state must have been aware of all the consequences 
relating to the harm, awareness of the general consequences of the act or omission are 
sufficient.170 The last criterion of proportionality states that a state must only act within 
proportional limits. In such an assessment characteristics such as the state’s ability to 
minimise the harm, the extent to which the state has contributed to the harm, as well as, the 
state’s capacity to mitigate the harm would have to examined on a case-to-case basis.171 
4.3 Breach of International Obligations  
4.3.1 Attribution  
     Article 2 ASR specifies two conditions for an international wrongful act of a state. Firstly, 
the act or omission in question must be attributable to the state. Secondly, the act or omission 
must constitute a breach of an international legal obligation in force for the state at the 
time.172 Concerning the conduct, it relates to the permission of GHG-emissions in the case of 
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climate change. The conduct can consist of the state either not implementing laws or policies 
regulating it, or by the state actually proclaiming the wrongful behaviour.173 In the present 
case, the anthropogenic GHG-emissions may be emitted by entities controlled by the state but 
in many industrialised states with a strong private sector, such emissions are mainly emitted 
by private entities.174 It should therefore be noted that a breach of an international treaty such 
as the UNFCCC or the Kyoto Protocol due to the state’s failure to implement legislation, 
complying with its obligations, or failure to implement proper compliance mechanisms, is 
attributable to the state. The source of emissions is thereby irrelevant as a state has an 
obligation to ensure compliance with its international obligations.175  
     International law normally avoids an approach that attributes actions or omissions of 
private actors to the state.176 However, in Chapter II ASR, some exceptions are stated and 
states can, as will be elaborated on below, be held responsible for actions committed by 
private actors. Article 8 ASR prescribes that when an activity is “under the control of” the 
state, the activity shall be attributed to the state. In Nicaragua v. US177 the Court stated that it 
needs to be shown that “effective control” is exercised by the state over the activities 
conducted by private persons.178 A state could thereby be held responsible for activities 
conducted by private entities or persons, if it in fact directed or approved the actions.179 That 
could perhaps be the case when the state has failed to ensure compliance with national 
legislation implementing its international obligations to mitigate GHG-emissions. Moreover, 
Article 11, states that any conduct of private entities or persons will be attributable to the 
state as soon as the conduct is recognised by the state as its own. According to the Tehran 
Hostages180 case, such conduct can be entirely committed by private entities but if the state 
retrospectively expressly approves and maintains the situation, it is attributed to the state.181 
Regarding environmental damage it has been argued by Judge Shahabuddeen in his 
dissenting opinion to the Certain Phosphates in Nauru182 case. 
     Secondly, it is argued that if GHG-emissions emitted by private entities were not 
attributable to the state it would lead to inconsistencies seeing that public international law 
would create a controversial distinction between private and state entities. Such a distinction 
could lead to increased support for privatisation, in order to make the emitting activities 
private.183 
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     In conclusion, it can be seen that the matter is not clear but that there is support of the 
view that actions to the detriment of the environment shall be attributed to the state.  
4.3.2 Breach of obligations  
      Firstly, it should be noted that a breach of obligation is contingent upon the primary rules. 
To that regards, the terms of the obligation, its interpretation and application, taking into 
account its objective and purpose and the factors in the case.184 
     The provisions on the breach of obligations are specified in Articles 12-15 ASR. As noted 
the rules on state responsibility do not define the primary rules and the obligation at hand can 
be of any origin or of any nature as long as it is of an international juridical standard.185 
Furthermore, it is important to note that there is no need to prove damage in order for the act 
to constitute a breach of an international obligation.186 However, the obligation needs to be 
binding upon the state, which corresponds to Article 64 VCLT stipulating that retrospective 
assumption of responsibility cannot be applied.187  
     The emissions of GHG as a breach of an international obligation cannot be denoted to 
consisting of a single act. It cannot be said that specific emissions cause climate change, as it 
is the cumulative effect of the emissions, which are contributing to climate change.188 Such 
breaches are regulated by Article 15 ASR and are defined as occuring at the time of the last 
action or omission making it sufficient to constitute the wrongful act. The number of acts or 
omissions which must occur before an international wrongful act is at hand is albeit 
determined by the primary rules, in this case the climate change regime and when the 
cumulative actions of a state are in breach of the due diligence obligation stipulated in the no-
harm rule.189 Verheyen argues the importance of differentiating between anthropogenic 
GHG-emissions that are damaging and those that constitute a breach within the scope of 
Article 15. However, such a breach is not contingent upon actual damage, it is sufficient that 
the emissions have increased the risk of damage.190  
     It is important to note the legal issues arising out of climate change being a result of the 
cumulative emissions of several states. The Articles in ASR do not preclude state 
responsibility in such a case. As prescribed in Article 47 (1) ASR, responsibility of one state 
may be invoked albeit several states are responsible for the same internationally wrongful act. 
Each state is thereby separately responsible for the conduct attributable to it and the 
responsibility of that state is not affected by the fact that other states acted in the same 
malicious way.191  
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     Furthermore, it is important to note that the Articles on State Responsibility do not set 
forward a standard of fault. Contrary to what is often the case in national law, there is neither 
a dolus nor a culpa requirement. This is a consequence of the division of the rules into 
primary and secondary rules. If there is a subjective element stipulated in the primary rules, it 
is guiding for the application of the fault requirement, i.e. such an assessment would be made 
to examine if the primary rules are breached.192 In the climate change regime and in the 
customary international law applicable to climate change, that is however not the case. It 
should be thus be noted that the no-harm rule does contain the requirement to show 
negligence.193 
4.4 Damage and Causation  
4.4.1 Damage     
     In the present case, some of the Kiribati islands have already disappeared. Nevertheless, 
most of the damages will occur in the future and it is thereby of importance to assess if future 
damages could form part of a claim.  
     The injuries included by the ILC comprise of both material and moral damages, including 
environmental damages.194 Material damage is defined as damages that are assessable in 
financial terms whereas moral damages include “individual pain and suffering, loss of loved 
ones or personal affront associated with the intrusion on one’s home and private life”.195  
     In cases regarding prospective losses such as in the present case, Garcia-Amador stated 
two criterions that need to be fulfilled. Firstly, there must be an unequivocal chain of 
causation linking the prospective loss with the imputable act, and secondly, the prospective 
loss “must not be too remote or speculative”.196 Okowa concurs and argues, “there is no 
reason why prospective damage cannot be the basis of responsibility if it is reasonably 
anticipated”.197 In the Nuclear Tests case between Australia and France, Australia’s 
argumentation was founded on future damage and the state argued that it could be calculated 
with a reasonable degree to which extent the Australian population would be exposed to the 
dangers of the exposure to radiation.198  
4.4.2 Causation  
     In a claim for reparation for damages incurred by climate change, causation plays a core 
part. The ILC has addressed the issue in Article 32.2 ASR. The Article states that an injury 
comprises of a damage caused by a wrongful act.199 However, under international law there is 
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no established formula to assess whether a particular act has caused the specific injury or 
damage.200  
     Thus, in domestic tort law, and to some extent in international law, a distinction can be 
made between general and specific causation, where general causation refers to the 
establishment of a causal link between the legally relevant activities, e.g. GHG-emissions, 
and a general outcome, e.g. climate change. Specific causation refers to the establishment of 
such a causal link between a specific activity and the specific outcome.201  
     The establishment of a causal relationship between a legally relevant behaviour and a loss 
or injury is naturally difficult regarding climate change due to the notion of causation being 
based upon a linear chain of event whereas damage incurred by climate change is not. 202 On 
the contrary, climate change comprises of several different factors, relating to both historical 
and current emissions. It is thereby difficult to make a distinction between what qualifies as a 
natural climate change process in comparison to the general contribution of anthropogenic 
GHG-emissions as well as the specific contribution of the respondent state.203 In conclusion, 
it is thereby impossible to prove that the emissions from a coal plant in one state which cause 
the sea-level to rise, thereby incurring damage in another state.  
     Additionally, a distinction is made between causation in fact and proximate causation.204 
Causation in fact refers to whether the wrongful act is the factual cause of the injured state’s 
damage. This approach can furthermore be divided into three different approaches, stretching 
from an approach arguing that the circumstances must be necessary for the outcome, to one 
where the conduct forms a necessary part of several conditions leading to the outcome and 
finally, an approach where the conduct is contributing to the outcome.205 
     The first approach includes the “but for test” or the “sine qua non” formula to establish 
causality, i.e. the act is the condition of the result or “but for the act, there would be no 
loss”.206 General causation can be established by using the approach as the scientific 
community continues to conclude the consequences of anthropogenic GHG-emissions with 
greater certainty. For instance, the IPCC has concluded with “high confidence” in its Fifth 
Assessment Report that the rise in sea level has increased with a rate higher than in the two 
previous millennia, and that 75 per cent of the observed rise is due to global warming.207 
However, concerning specific causality the issue becomes increasingly more difficult. As 
previously mentioned, climate change is a matter of cumulative acts. A test which requires 
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states to show that without the respondent’s acts the damage would not have occurred, is 
thereby ill suited to determine the causal link between anthropogenic GHG-emissions and 
damage incurred to Kiribati.208  
     Therefore, the approach where causation can be established through contribution might be 
better suited for the task. The approach stipulates that if the act has caused a ‘material 
increase in risk’ or ‘contributed to’ the injury, causality can be established between the act 
and the injury irrespective of other factors contributing to the injury.209 The approach was 
argued by the Australian Government in the Nuclear Tests case.210 Australia argued that any 
additional exposure to radioactive contamination, regardless of the amount, substantially 
contributed to an increased risk of radiation-related injuries. In conclusion, any material 
contribution to increasing the risk could impose responsibility.211  
     Moreover, the criterions of proximate causation must be fulfilled. The criterions entail that 
the respondent state must only make good those injuries that were foreseeable, i.e. “normal”, 
“natural” or “necessary or inevitable” consequences of the act or omission by the respondent 
state.212 The test must be fulfilled both on the basis of its objective criterions, i.e. that 
anthropogenic GHG-emissions cause climate change and that this is a normal and natural 
consequence thereof, as well as, on the basis of the subjective criterions, i.e. that it can be 
reasonably foreseen that anthropogenic GHG-emissions would cause climate change and the 
injuries incurred by Kiribati.213 However, it should be noted that the foreseeability test does 
not refer to the state at hand. In the Corfu Channel case, the Court found Albania responsible 
independent of their knowledge or ability to foresee which ships could be damaged, Albania 
was held responsible on the fact that the state knew and thereby could foresee that the mines 
could cause damage to ships.214  
4.5 Defences  
     There are six different circumstances precluding wrongfulness as stipulated in ASR. These 
are consent (Article 20), self-defence (Article 21), countermeasures (Article 22), force 
majeure (Article 23), distress (Article 24) and necessity (Article 25).  
     Consent of the injured state precludes wrongfulness in relation to the consenting state. 
Though the consent must be valid. What constitutes a valid consent is outside the scope of the 
rules on state responsibility, thus it includes issues such as the authority of the agent or 
person giving the consent. Furthermore, the consent must be expressly awarded and cannot 
be merely presumed from the actions of the state.215 Self-defence precludes wrongfulness if 
the respondent state’s actions were caused by an attack and the respondent state acted in self-
defence in conformity with the United Nations Charter.216 Countermeasures refers to cases 
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where the claimant state has breached its obligations and the respondent state has responded 
with acts not in conformity with its obligations. In such cases, the wrongfulness of the act is 
precluded.217 The fourth circumstance precluding wrongfulness is force majeure, which refers 
to situations where the state is precluded to act in conformity with its international obligations 
due to “the occurrence of an irresistible force or an unforeseen event”.218 The state cannot 
have any other ways to act and have no real possibility of escaping its effects.219 Furthermore, 
the circumstance of distress precludes wrongfulness in cases where peoples’ lives are at stake 
and it the agent has no other reasonable way of saving lives but by not acting in conformity 
with the states obligations.220 The final situation precluding wrongfulness is necessity, which 
is applicable when the state is facing a grave and imminent peril and the conduct is the only 
way for the state to safeguard an essential interest. The wording of the title reflects the 
exceptional cases in which the circumstance can preclude wrongfulness. Furthermore, ILC’s 
commentary stresses the strict limitations imposed on its use.221 
     In conclusion, many of the defences are ill suited for a case of climate change. However, 
as will be elaborated on below, consent and necessity might for part of a respondent states 
defence.  
4.6 Remedies  
     The main obligation of a state responsible for an international wrongful act is stipulated in 
Article 30 ASR, namely cessation.222 The Article prescribes that the state must cease the act 
and if circumstances so require, offer appropriate assurances of non-repetition.223 Moreover, 
it is of relevance to note that the obligation refers to the primary obligations, and the 
obligation of cessation is thereby determined by reference to the obligations stipulated in the 
UNFCCC, the Kyoto Protocol or the no-harm rule. It can thereby be distinguished from the 
similar rule of restitution by the fact that the obligation of cessation always applies whereas 
restitution is subject to a proportionality test and furthermore, is not always viable.224 This 
exemplifies the issues regarding cessation concerning climate change, where cessation of 
dangerous levels of anthropogenic GHG-emissions would be difficult. However, it would be 
in line with the rules on state responsibility.225   
     Article 31 ASR states the obligation to make reparation and is a well-established principle 
in international law. In the Chorzów Factory case, the PCIJ stated that “it is a principle of 
international law, and even a general conception of law, that any breach of an engagement 
involves an obligation to make reparation”.226 Furthermore, the Court stated that reparations 
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musts “as far as possible, wipe out all the consequences of the illegal act and re-establish the 
situation which would, in all probability, have existed if that act had not been committed”.227 
     Reparations in ASR are stipulated in a hierarchical manner. Preference is given to 
restitution, followed by compensation and satisfaction in cases where compensation is not 
possible.228 
     Restitution as stipulated in Article 35 ASR requires the state to re-establish the situation 
that existed prior to the wrongful act.229 It is based upon a proportionality test and can thereby 
be partially precluded if it is materially impossible or involves a disproportional burden upon 
the respondent state.230 The ILC noted that despite the primacy of the rule of restitution, it is 
frequently not applicable or inadequate and the gaps are thereby often filled by 
compensation.231  
     The remedy applicable when restitution is not available or applicable is compensation. 
The state is under an obligation to compensate and such compensation shall cover any 
financially assessable damage.232 This does however not exclude moral damages.233 It 
generally consist of monetary payments but may take the forms of other values.234 Damages 
relating to pollution include both pecuniary such as adaption costs and loss of revenue as well 
as non-pecuniary damages in the forms of long-term impacts on the environment, which are 
difficult to measure in monetary terms.235 However, they are considered to be “no less real 
and compensable than damage to property”.236  
     The United Nations Compensation Commission (UNCC) dealt with claims for 
compensation regarding environmental damage in respect of the damage and depletion of 
natural resources in Kuwait due to Iraq’s unlawful invasion and occupation of Kuwait. The 
Commission awarded compensation for environmental damage and costs relating to, inter 
alia, abatement and prevention of environmental damage, reasonable measures to restore and 
clean the environment, depletion of or damage to natural resources, as well as expenses for 
monitoring and assessing environmental damage and public health for the purpose of 
investigating and combating increased health risks as a result of the environmental 
damage.237 As a result the UNCC awarded approximately US$ 5.2 billion distributed on over 
100 claims based on environmental damage.238 It is important to note that the Security 
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Council had already found Iraq liable for loss and damages resulting from the invasion in 
Kuwait.239 The case thereby differs from one relating to climate change as the question of 
responsibility had already been established. However, it could be used as a precedent for the 
specification of the various categories compensable of damages.240  
     In cases where restitution and compensation are not sufficient to rectify the injury caused 
by the international wrongful conduct, Article 37 ASR stipulates an obligation of satisfaction. 
The Article puts forward some examples of satisfaction and states that it could e.g., consist of 
an acknowledgement of the breach or an apology. ILC considered it the appropriate remedy 
for moral damage that is not financially assessable or in cases of non-material injury.241 
Satisfaction could be an appropriate remedy in cases of climate change damage and could 
include measures such as policy shifts that guarantee non-repetition. Furthermore, a formal 
apology as well as the formal recognition of the state’s contribution to climate change would 
raise the awareness necessary for the effort to mitigate climate change.242  
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5 Can State Responsibility be 
Established in Practice?  
5.1 The Case  
          This chapter seeks to examine and apply the findings in the previous chapters regarding 
state responsibility in a hypothetical case study. As previously mentioned it is likely that an 
increased sea-level rise will cause damage to the Republic of Kiribati. In a low emissions 
scenario the rise is expected to amount to up to 45 cm, whereas in a high emissions scenario 
the forecasts estimate a rise up to 60 cm by 2100.243 However, the rise could be larger as it is 
difficult to predict the extent to which the melting of large ice-sheets in Greenland and 
Antarctica will contribute to the rise in sea level.244 The IPCC has already estimated that the 
built-in vulnerabilities of the low-lying islands will increase the potential detriments of the 
state and lead to damages in form of loss of land, as well as through saltwater intrusion and 
shoreline erosion.245 These increased vulnerabilities will make the state particularly 
vulnerable to extreme weather events.246 Thus, most importantly, the increased vulnerabilities 
and the ecological damages may over time lead to the land being uninhabitable, effects, 
which are already visible within the state.247 The state would thereby need to relocate its 
entire population due to the effects of climate change. 
     The damages are financially assessable on two grounds. Firstly, they would amount to a 
need for adaption measures and increase the costs of infrastructure. Secondly, the 
consequences would amount to a loss of the state’s GDP, e.g. through the loss of land.  
     In this hypothetical claim, the Republic of Kiribati therefore claims: (1) compensation for 
adaptation costs due to sea-level rise; and (2) a migration scheme allowing for a Kiribati 
relocation. 
   The selection of an appropriate respondent state reflects the difficulties in establishing state 
responsibility in practice. Concerning any potential respondent state great legal hurdles arise 
in form of, inter alia, jurisdictional issues or regarding the primary or secondary rules. This 
chapter does therefore not seek to pose a single state as the appropriate respondent but rather 
examine the advantages and disadvantages of bringing a case against different respondent 
states.   
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5.2 Attribution 
As previously mentioned, the acts or omissions in question must be attributable to the state 
for state responsibility to be established.248 Assuming that there are binding obligations under 
the UNFCCC for the states not bound by the Kyoto Protocol, and under the Kyoto Protocol 
for the states that are parties. A situation where the state approves of  GHG-emissions above 
set targets, either through permitting policies or in any other way by which it implicitly or 
explicitly approves the conduct, it is attributable and could incur state responsibility.249 This 
is founded on the assumption that there are binding obligations under the UNFCCC regarding 
the states not bound by the Kyoto Protocol. As a state therefore has the obligation to ensure 
that they are implemented nationally.250  
   However, in the case that such an assumption would not bear ground. Kiribati would have 
to demonstrate that the activities emitting GHG are either governed by the state or under the 
state’s control, either by the corporation exercising government authority under Article 4 
ASR or concerning private corporations, through the state exercising effective control or by 
the state recognising the conduct as its own.251  
   It could be difficult to argue that the state-owned corporations exercise elements of 
government authority within the scope of Article 4 ASR precluding attribution. However, as 
Boom notes, it could also be argued that e.g. the provision of electricity is the core function 
of the state.252 Concerning Articles 8 proving attribution under the said provision would mean 
that Kiribati would have to show that the government in question exercised effective control 
and that the corporations were under the explicit control and direction of the government, 
which would prove evidential difficulties.253 Under Article 11 ASR, Kiribati could though 
argue that the government has recognised the conduct as its own. Such an argument could be 
based on a situation where the state approves of GHG-emissions above set targets, either 
through permitting policies or in any other way implicitly or explicitly approves of the 
conduct.254 
5.3 Breach of Obligations  
5.3.1 The Climate Change Regime  
As mentioned, Article 4.2 in conjunction with Article 2 UNFCCC could create a legal 
obligation of conduct to reverse emission trends to a level that would “prevent dangerous 
anthropogenic interference with the climate system” and thereby stabilise global warming.255 
If Kiribati was to launch a contentious case it is of importance to note that the Berlin Mandate 
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stipulated that the provisions in Article 4.2(a) and (b) were deemed inadequate and that the 
Protocol should enforce stronger obligations.256 Thereby a conflict between the two treaties 
could be at hand concerning the commitments under Article 4.2(a) and (b). Seeing there are 
no conflict rules stipulated in neither the UNFCCC nor the Kyoto Protocol, neither are all 
parties to the UNFCCC parties to the Protocol, Article 30.4 VCLT applies. The provisions 
provide that in cases where the parties are parties to both treaties, the earlier only applies to 
such extent that its provisions are compatible with the latter treaty. In cases where one of the 
parties are only parties to one of the treaties, the treaty that both parties are party to governs 
their mutual rights and obligations.257 Seeing that Kiribati is a party to the Kyoto Protocol, a 
dispute against another party therefore leads to the application of the said protocol. In cases 
where the respondent is not a party to the Protocol, the UNFCCC therefore applies seeing that 
it is the Treaty in force for both parties.  
   The states who could be potential respondents would thereby be the ones who either have 
not ratified the Kyoto Protocol, and could be examined under the rules of the UNFCCC, or 
the ones which failed to meet their QUELRO’s which could then be in breach of the Kyoto 
Protocol. In 2011, the states falling into one of the categories were Iceland, Spain, Australia, 
Portugal, Japan, New Zealand, Canada, Greece, Ireland, United States of America (USA), 
Liechtenstein, Austria, and Norway.258 It is important to note that the European Union (EU) 
has, in accordance with Article 4 of the Kyoto Protocol chosen to count its emissions 
together, rather than individually and combined the EU has met its targets.259 Furthermore, 
Australia, Japan, Liechtenstein, New Zealand and Norway met their targets, some of the 
states due to the flexibility mechanism the Protocol provides.260  
Therefore, only Iceland, Canada and the United States of America could be in breach of its 
climate regime obligations. According to current data, Iceland has increased its emissions 
with 25 per cent since 1990.261 However, in comparison to the total emissions of Annex I 
states, Iceland only emitted 0.02 per cent of the total GHG-emissions in 2011.262 Canada and 
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the US on the other hand have increased their emissions with 18.7 and 8 per cent since 1990, 
however the states amount for 3.22 and 30 per cent of the total Annex I emissions.263  
In 1999, Iceland refused to ratify the Kyoto Protocol arguing that it would be impossible for 
the state to meet the obligations mainly due to mitigating action taken before 1990, which 
would make further reductions difficult. Furthermore, Iceland argues that due to the small 
economical size a single heavy industry would lead to a high increase in percentage, an 
increase that would be unnoticeable in a larger economy.264  However, the state ratified the 
Protocol in 2002 with a QUELRO of an emission increase of 10 per cent.265 The state had a 
significant 25.8 per cent increase in emissions in 1990 to 2011 which is largely due to the 
expansion of heavy industry in Iceland. In 2009, the state reported that it would decrease its 
emissions of -15 per cent relative to 1990 by 2020. Thus, climate change NGOs claim that 
with the current legislation implemented, Iceland is expected to increase its emissions within 
25-92 per cent by 2020.266 Overall, the increase in emissions, as well as the lack of efficient 
legislation in place to mitigate the state’s emissions, it could be argued that the state does not 
fulfil its obligation of conduct to reverse emissions trends.  
     Canada ratified the Kyoto Protocol in December 2002 but decided to withdraw its 
ratification in 2011, as the first state to do so. It was officially not a party to the protocol in 
December 2012.267 As Article 27 of the Protocol does not stipulate any guidance on the 
consequences of a withdrawal, recourse must be taken to general law as stipulated in the 
chapeau of Article 70 VCLT. According to Article 70.1(a) VCLT, Canada no longer has any 
obligation to further perform the treaty.  
     Canada became a party to the UNFCCC in 1992 and has been bound by its provisions 
since 1994 when the Convention entered into force.268 Although the Kyoto Protocol no longer 
binds the state, the UNFCCC is still in force. On a national level, Canada enacted its National 
Action Program on Climate Change (NAPCC) in 1995. The NAPCC functioned as a flexible 
instrument including voluntary mechanisms that could function as a platform between 
stakeholders.269 However, in 2005, almost ten years after the entry into force of the 
Convention, Canada’s GHG-emissions had continued to increase with almost 25 per cent.270 
This could indicate that although the state has regulated GHG-emissions, the measures had 
not been sufficient to mitigate the emissions. Secondly, a compelling reason for Canada 
breaching its UNFCCC obligation is the fact that the state chose to withdraw from Kyoto 
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Protocol seeing that displays the state’s inaction concerning reversing emission trends. This 
could therefore imply that Canada had not fulfilled its obligations to prevent dangerous 
anthropogenic interference.  
At present, the USA is the second largest emitter of GHG and the largest cumulative 
contributor to global emissions.271 The US never ratified the Protocol and will be assessed 
based on its UNFCCC obligations. Similarly to Canada, the US emissions have continued to 
increase since the ratification of the UNFCCC in 1992.272 Furthermore, the state’s emissions 
grew faster after the entry into force of the Convention, which could be an indication of a 
lack of action in mitigating GHG-emissions.273 The state implemented the national Climate 
Change Action Plan in 1993 and in its reports to the UNFCCC declared that it would be able 
to reverse its emissions to the 1990s levels by the year 2000, a statement that was reaffirmed 
by President Clinton in a public announcement.274 However, the state failed to meet its own 
targets and emissions increased with 14 per cent in the period 1990-2000.275 This could, 
according to Verheyen indicate that the state’s own action plans were not sufficiently 
implemented.276 Furthermore, the state’s rejection of the binding commitments of the Kyoto 
Protocol could be seen as a breach of its UNFCCC obligations. As previously stipulated, the 
negotiators of the Berlin Mandate stated that the commitments in the UNFCCC were not 
sufficient in order to meet the objective of the UNFCCC, as stipulated in Article 2 
UNFCCC.277 Failing to participate in the Protocol could therefore indicate that the state’s 
commitment to achieve the objective of the Convention was not sufficient. In November 
2014, the US pledged, in a non-binding agreement with China, to decrease its emissions with 
25 per cent before the year 2030.278 The US pledge is a step in the right direction, although it 
should be noted that the state has previously made commitments it had not been able to fulfil 
and that the political and institutional system of the state makes the legislation process 
difficult, which has resulted in climate policies on a federal level remaining voluntary.279 
     In conclusion, it is noted that all states may argue that the obligations enshrined in the 
UNFCCC are non-binding. However, a counter-argument of Kiribati could be based on the 
good faith and Article 18 VCLT. The US has not ratified the VCLT but as previously noted 
the provision reflects international customary law.280 Based on such an argument Kiribati 
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could state that the increased emissions of the states are contrary to the object and purpose of 
the Convention and thereby constitute an international breach on such grounds.  
Although, it should also be noted that Article 4.10 UNFCCC stipulates that consideration 
shall be given to states that are highly dependent on income generated from the production, 
processing or consumption of fossil fuels when assessing their implementation of the 
Convention. In a contentious case, it is thereby likely that the states at hand will argue that 
they fall under the category and that there cannot be a breach of obligations concerning the 
Convention.  
5.3.2 The No-Harm Rule 
 As mentioned, the no-harm rule stipulates that states have a due diligence obligation to 
prevent or minimise the risk of transboundary harm.  In this case it must be shown that the 
state has had an opportunity to act, foreseen the harm as well as taken proportionate measures 
to mitigate the risk.281 Under the no-harm rule members of the EU could be held responsible 
individually, which could make it possible to examine states such as Spain, which has 
increased its emissions with 25 per cent or Malta and Cyprus, which have increased their 
emissions with 50 percent respectively, but do not have obligations under the Kyoto Protocol. 
States such as Portugal, Greece, Austria, Norway, Ireland and Japan could also be subjects 
under the no-harm rule as they have increased their emissions.282 Turkey who has increased 
its emissions with 125 per cent as well as both Iceland, Canada and the USA could be held 
responsible.283 In such a case, Kiribati would have to show that each state had an opportunity 
to act. All mentioned states, except for the USA are minor emitters as compared to the global 
emissions.284 However, as stated, previously, states are obliged to act to take effective 
measures based on the best available technologies in order to fulfil the criterion and it could 
be argued that with the number of states that have decreased their GHG-emissions, of which 
some substantially, the efforts these states have undertaken are not sufficient. Although, 
regarding the states which have increased their emissions, yet only to all small extent, it could 
be argued they have fulfilled their opportunity to act as such a small increase could indicate 
that efforts are taken to mitigate emissions.  
     Secondly, the ‘foreseeability-test’ must be undertaken. In the present case the relationship 
between anthropogenic GHG-emissions and climate change have been the subject of science 
since the 19th century. At the Stockholm Conference in 1972, it was recognised that increased 
anthropogenic GHG-emissions could lead to a rise in the Earth’s temperature with a 
minimum of 0.5°C. Furthermore, in the first IPCC report in 1990, the Committee established 
with certainty that the increase in anthropogenic GHG-emissions leads to an increase in the 
GHG-concentrations in the atmosphere which results in the warming of the Earth. Sea-level 
rise was one of the first impacts discussed in the first IPCC assessment report, making states 
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aware of the impacts for at least two decades.285 It can therefore be argued that states, 
especially since the release of the first IPCC report, cannot argue that they could not foresee 
the risks of anthropogenic GHG-emissions.286  
     It is based on the last step, the proportionality test that difficulties arise. It must be shown 
that the state at hand has failed to take proportionate measures to reduce or minimise the risk 
posed to Kiribati. The assessment balances the sovereign interests of the emitting state with 
the interests of the injured state and the technical and economical abilities of the emitting 
state must be taken into consideration.287 In the present case it could be argued that all Annex 
I states have the economical ability to mitigate their emissions, especially seeing that studies 
have shown that there are large economic benefits in mitigating climate change and that these 
outweigh the costs.288 Furthermore, the potential damages incurred by Kiribati are large and it 
could be argued that only significant measures to reduce emissions could be considered 
proportionate.289 However, in this regard states could argue that in accordance with the 
principle of common but differentiated responsibilities, states with well-developed economies 
and governance structures have a larger responsibility to mitigate emissions.290 With respect 
to the mentioned states, USA, Canada, Spain and Turkey are among the top 20 states with the 
highest gross domestic product (GDP) in the world. Iceland, Cyprus and Malta fall lower on 
the scale.291 However, that could arguably relate to the small sizes of the states rather than an 
indication of the development of their economies. Moreover, Iceland, Cyprus and Malta 
could argue that in a proportionality assessment the state’s contribution to the damage must 
be taken into consideration and that the states’ contributions to the harm in absolute terms is 
small.292 
     In conclusion, the mentioned states have had an opportunity to act to a foreseeable harm 
and regarding the potential damage at hand as well as the economic capabilities of the states, 
it is possible to argue that at least the larger emitters have breached their no-harm obligations. 
However, it should be noted that further examination of each state is necessary to establish 
such a breach.  
5.4 Damage and Causation  
     As previously mentioned, proving causation could be one of the greatest hurdles in the 
launch of a contentious case due to the multicausal nature of climate change as well as the 
large number of different emitters.293 In the present case, Kiribati argues that the GHG-
emissions of one state has resulted in a sea-level rise causing economic damages. Kiribati 
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would thereby have to show both factual as well as proximate causation in order to claim 
reparations.294 Furthermore, if Kiribati was to process the claim on the basis of future 
damages it would have to prove an unequivocal chain of causation linking the prospective 
loss with the imputable act and secondly, the prospective loss “must not be too remote or 
speculative”.295 As the ‘but for’ test approach is not well suited for the case at hand, causation 
shall be examined under the probabilistic approach. In such a case, Kiribati could rely upon 
IPCC assessments of the future damage Kiribati will face. The scientific community is to a 
greater certainty reaching the conclusions on which Kiribati are basing its claim and COP has 
noted that the need to relocate is a damage that with great certainty can be established.296 It 
can therefore be argued that a claim based on such damages would not be too remote or 
speculative. 
5.4.1 Factual causation  
As previously noted the “but for test” is ill suited to determine the causal link between 
anthropogenic GHG-emissions. Okowa argues that setting a standard for causation where the 
issue is dependent on evidentiary difficulties would undermine the objectives of the primary 
rules.297 Therefore, she argues, tribunals should not only rule on direct and positive evidence, 
but also upon probable and inferential evidence. As Okowa notes, it is thus questionable if 
international tribunals would be prepared to act upon such evidence.298 However, the current 
assessment will examine Kiribati’s potential to argue under the ‘contributing to’ approach.299 
The ICJ has not ruled upon the approach but as it has been argued previously it could be 
possible that the ICJ would accept the approach. In such a case, Kiribati would have to show 
that the emissions of the respondent state has caused a “material increase in risk” as argued 
by Australia in the Nuclear Tests case.300  
Firstly, Kiribati would have to show that anthropogenic emissions have caused an increased 
risk for damage to property as well as moral damages. As mentioned IPCC has concluded 
that sea level rise is globally attributed to anthropogenic GHG-emissions.301 Relating to 
Kiribati the average sea-level rise falls within the estimates of the global average. However, 
the data fluctuates to a greater extent than globally, which could relate to phenomena such as 
the El Niño-Southern Oscillation (ENSO).302 In conclusion, as the data fall within the general 
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scope of the estimated global sea-level rise phenomena as ENSO could have less importance 
in an assessment and it could be argued that the sea-level rise in Kiribati is caused by 
anthropogenic GHG-emissions. As it has been noticed that the ecological damages and a need 
to relocate its population is a danger to states’ vulnerable to sea-level rise, there is potential 
for a successful argument.303 
Secondly, Kiribati would have to show that the respondent state’s emissions have caused an 
increased material risk for damage. Concerning small emitters such as Iceland, Cyprus and 
Malta it would difficult for Kiribati to prove that the states have increased the risk for 
Kiribati. Thus, for states such as the US, which is the largest cumulative emitter globally, 
such an argument could have bearing concerning the state. Moreover, it could be argued that 
one state’s actions are a part of several states collective wrongful acts by multiple states of 
which the single state’s actions have caused an increased material risk with reference to 
property damage and the need to relocate.304  
5.4.2 Proximate causation  
Fulfilling proximate causation’s objective test, in form of showing that the anthropogenic 
GHG-emissions cause sea-level rise and that this is the normal and natural consequence 
thereof could be done by referring to e.g. the IPCC which has constituted that sea-level rise is 
caused by global warming.305 However, concerning a certain state this is, as with the factual 
causation-test, increasingly difficult especially regarding small emitters as their contribution 
to GHG in the atmosphere makes it problematic to establish a clear sequence between their 
emissions and the damage incurred by Kiribati.306 However, a potential argument could also 
be that since anthropogenic GHG-emissions are cumulative and thereby indivisible, all 
emissions have contributed to sea-level rise. A natural sequence could therefore be shown to 
all emitters, including smaller emitters.307 
     The subjective element of proximate causation, i.e. the foreseeability test can, as noted, be 
fulfilled as the consequences of anthropogenic GHG-emissions have been known since 1990 
when the first IPCC report stated that anthropogenic emissions could lead to an rise in the 
sea-level.308 However, as GHG remains in the atmosphere for up to a century it is not the 
emissions which have occurred in the past two decades which are the main source of global 
warming.309 As the proximate causation requires reasonable foreseeability, only the emissions 
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emitted in the last two decades are legally relevant which would prove a great legal hurdle for 
Kiribati.  
5.5 Defences  
     Both Verheyen and Boom argue the difficulties in applying the defences to international 
wrongful acts causing climate change damage.310 Boom analyses the circumstances 
precluding wrongfulness concerning consent and necessity and applies this in a climate 
change context. Regarding consent Boom envisages a scenario where it can be argued that 
states have consented to the targets within the limits stipulated in the Kyoto Protocol and that 
they thereby cannot claim responsibility for emissions within the Kyoto limits. However, this 
reasoning is according to Boom precluded by the fact that states such as Kiribati have made 
declarations stating that the ratification of the UNFCCC or Kyoto Protocol never shall 
constitute a renunciation of their rights under the rules on state responsibility.311  
   Relating to necessity, Boom argues that there are possibilities of such a defence being 
successful is more likely. This could be done with the state referring to that mitigation actions 
would affect the state’s economy, environment and human rights protection. Such 
considerations are enshrined in the UNFCCC, especially in Article 4.10 UNFCCC that 
prescribes that the parties shall consider states that are especially reliant upon resources, 
which contribute to climate change, e.g. the OPEC-members.312 However, such an argument 
is unlikely as necessity is based upon the condition that it cannot be argued if it seriously 
impairs the essential interests of the state toward which the obligation exists, or the 
international community as a whole.313  
     Moreover, the continued GHG-emissions of states, in breach of its climate change regime, 
and no-harm, obligations are unlikely to constitute the only means for a state to safeguard its 
interests against a grave and imminent peril.314     
5.6 Remedies  
     If state responsibility is established it is likely that the Court would adhere to Kiribati’s 
claim for remedies for the damages incurred by the state. As the damage would be financially 
assessable, compensation would be an appropriate remedy.315 Burkett and Campbell argue 
that in the case of climate change damages compensation could include both compensation in 
form of money transfers as well as adaptation measures such as insurance plans or technology 
transfers.316  
   A migration scheme could take different forms. Firstly, relocation could be implemented 
through the purchase of uninhabited land for resettlement on e.g. nearby islands. In the 
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present case Kiribati has already purchased land in Fiji.317 Campbell argues that it is 
appropriate that the compensation should cover such costs. Furthermore, he includes 
contributions for airfares, the purchase of land for resettlement and the building or purchase 
of homes as potential costs to be covered.318 In such as case, the costs of relocation would be 
financially assessable and thereby fall under the scope of Article 35 ASR.  
   However, if Kiribati was to claim that the citizens of the state should be awarded protection 
as migrants in the respondent state, it becomes increasingly challenging for such a claim to 
fall under one of the three remedies stipulated in ASR.319  The obligation that the remedy 
must commensurate with the loss could be regarded as a founding principle in the doctrine of 
remedies in international law.320 In the case where a government is forced to relocate its 
population due to another state’s wrongful acts, the question to be answered is how such an 
injury is remedied. As such, the question has never been brought forward in international 
adjudication, there is no clear answer and one is thereby forced to derive conclusions from 
the provisions in ASR and its commentary.  
   Firstly, as noted, claiming restitution in such a case would be difficult as climate change 
causes damages that cannot be subject to restitution without great effort and at a great cost.321 
It could possibly be argued that the respondent state has an obligation to artificially create 
new islands to which the I-Kiribati could relocate, or through an adaptation effort so vast that 
a relocation would be unnecessary. The responsible state would thereby making an effort to 
restore the status quo ante, or at least creating a result which would come as close to status 
quo ante as possible. The respondent state would likely argue that such an obligation would 
create a disproportionate burden.322 However, the ILC commentary provides that the 
proportionality assessment shall be a balanced assessment between the burden on the 
responsible state and the benefit gained by the injured state. Such an assessment shall be 
based on equity and reasonableness but with an inclination towards the injured state. More 
importantly, the commentary provides that “[t]he balance will invariably favour the injured 
state in any case where the failure to provide restitution would jeopardize its political 
independence or economic stability”.323 Thereby making it possible for Kiribati to argue that 
failure to provide restitution would jeopardize these characteristics of the state seeing that 
such a failure could lead to the non-existence to the state. It is probable that Kiribati would 
not have to prove that the threat to its political independence or economic stability is real or 
imminent but rather only show that it would “jeopardize” these elements. Such an argument 
could successfully be based on current scientific assessments.324 However, the respondent 
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state would only be accountable for a proportion of the damage, of which there is a causal 
link between its actions and the injury incurred by Kiribati. It could thereby be 
disproportional for it to bear the whole burden of restitution albeit the balance being in favour 
of Kiribati.325 
     Therefore, the question is, whether awarding protection to Kiribati migrants could 
constitute a form of compensation. The ILC notes that compensation, although most often 
consists of a monetary payment could also “take the form, as agreed, of other forms of 
value”.326 Could an obligation to award protection constitute such an “other value”? Based on 
the meaning of the word “compensation”, which is said to constitute an award to someone in 
recognition of a loss, awarding protection of I-Kiribati could constitute a form of 
compensation.327 
     Furthermore, as the state is under an obligation to make “full reparation” for the damages 
it has caused, the respondent state must compensate for the loss of land and thereby the loss 
of territory for the state to inhabit its migrants. Such compensation cannot be awarded in 
another way but by compensating the state financially in order to purchase new territory, or 
by awarding protection to the citizens of that state. However, as the most common way of 
compensation is through monetary payments it is not certain that a Court would prescribe 
such a remedy. The difficulties points to the unique situation that international law is facing 
concerning disappearing states due to climate change.  
5.7 Issues relating to climate change adjudication  
5.7.1 Contentious case  
     Article 14 UNFCCC stipulates that the “parties concerned shall seek a settlement of the 
dispute through negotiation or any peaceful means of their own choice”. Parties are 
furthermore offered an option to declare the jurisdiction of the ICJ as compulsory or request 
the creation of a conciliation commission. Such as commission shall have the powers to 
render a recommendatory award, which the parties shall consider in good faith. To date the 
rules of procedure for establishing such a commission have not been adopted by the COP.328 
The question of whether recourse can be taken to the ICJ therefore arises. The advantages 
with launching a case at the ICJ are many. Firstly, the award would be binding upon the 
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parties.329 Secondly, the awards of the ICJ are recognised as the interpretations of the highest 
legal and moral authority and would thereby carry great weight.330 
5.7.1.1 Standing  
     The ILC has identified five different situations where a state is entitled to invoke state 
responsibility for the breach of an obligation. Firstly, an injured state itself may invoke 
responsibility in accordance with Article 42 ASR. This can be done by the state individually 
or together with a group of states. Secondly, a state can have standing if the matter regards an 
obligation which is owed to the international community or a group of states in which the 
state is included. Thirdly, a state has legal standing if it has been injured and the alleged 
breach affects all the states concerned. The fourth and fifth categories involve public interest 
standing.331  
     In the present case, Kiribati would likely argue that the state has standing based on the 
second category recognised by the ILC. As the commitments stipulated in the UNFCCC as 
well as the obligations enshrined in the no-harm rule are owed towards all the parties to the 
Convention and the no-harm rule towards the whole international community, albeit Kiribati 
is specifically affected. The state would have to show that its rights under the UNFCCC and 
the no-harm rule ha been violated and that the state has an individualised interest in bringing 
the case.332  
Concerning the individualized interest Kiribati could argue that the state has such an interest 
based on its vulnerability. The vulnerability of SIDS such as Kiribati has been recognised in 
several instances by the UNFCCC.333 Furthermore, as mentioned in previous chapters, 
Kiribati is specifically vulnerable regarding its low-lying typography, geographically small 
size, small economy and remoteness. There are thereby convincing arguments for Kiribati 
being able to establish standing.334  
5.7.1.2 Jurisdiction  
     Jurisdiction at the ICJ is obtained through the consent of the parties to the dispute in three 
ways. Firstly, jurisdiction can be established through a special agreement between the 
parties.335 Secondly, jurisdiction can be established through special Treaties or Conventions 
that specifically refer to the ICJ as the dispute settlement mechanism.336 Thirdly, states can 
make unilateral declarations acknowledging the Court’s compulsory jurisdiction ipso facto 
without a special agreement.337  
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     Regarding jurisdiction established through a special arrangement scholars argue that it is 
unlikely that it would be consented by the respondent party.338 Jurisdiction based on a mutual 
agreement has previously mainly been concluded in cases concerning territorial disputes 
where both the parties have an interest in an independent body ruling on the dispute.339 In the 
present case it is unlikely that the respondent state would willingly subject itself to such 
jurisdiction as the consequences of a ruling in favour of Kiribati would be vast.340 
     Secondly, jurisdiction could be established based on an independent Treaty. In the present 
case, UNFCCC refers to the ICJ as a mechanism for dispute settlement under Article 14 
UNFCCC. However, such a referral is based upon both parties having deposited their consent 
to the compulsory jurisdiction of the ICJ under the UNFCCC.341 At present, only the 
Netherlands has declared such consent, and only in relation to another party accepting the 
consent.342  
     Nevertheless, that does not preclude an ICJ ruling on climate change. As previously 
mentioned some states have consented to the compulsory jurisdiction of the ICJ. Kiribati is 
not one of them but has the possibility of making such a declaration. Currently, 70 states have 
declared their acceptance of the Court’s compulsory jurisdiction.343 Of the states, which could 
be at hand regarding the establishment of state responsibility for their emissions, only 
Austria, Portugal, Greece, Norway, Ireland, Japan, Canada, Spain, Malta and Cyprus have 
accepted the Court’s compulsory jurisdiction. Greece, Norway and Ireland have done so 
without any relevant reservations and it would thereby be possible for Kiribati to establish 
jurisdiction if a case was brought against one of these states.   
     All other states, except for Cyprus, have done so with a reservation excepting disputes that 
the parties agree to settle by other means of peaceful settlement.344 This could, if the case is 
based on the climate change regime indicate a recourse to the system under Articles 14 
UNFCCC and 18 and 19 KP. Article 14 UNFCCC stipulates that parties shall take recourse to 
negotiation on “any other peaceful mechanism of their own choice” and opts for the 
possibility to declare the jurisdiction of either the ICJ and/or an arbitrary panel.345 However, 
as mentioned, only one party has used the voluntary mechanism and it could thereby be 
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argued that there is no practical recourse to “other means of peaceful dispute settlement” as 
Article 19 refers to Article 14 UFCCC, the same conclusion is applicable. Furthermore, 
Article 18 Kyoto Protocol creates the Protocol’s own compliance mechanism, although as 
noted, the mechanism regulates the compliance within the Protocol and is a form of 
enforcement mechanism rather than a mechanism for inter-state disputes.346           
     Moreover, Japan, Portugal, Spain, Cyprus and Malta have included reservations 
stipulating that the other party cannot have declared compulsory jurisdiction only in relation 
to or for the purposes of the case at hand or that such a deposition was made less than 12 
months prior to the commencement of the case.347 It is outside the scope of the present thesis 
to examine which other reasons Kiribati might have to declare the jurisdiction of the ICJ 
compulsory, thus it should be noted that in such a case, Kiribati would have to bear the 
minimum period of time in mind.  
     As a member of the Commonwealth of Nations, an association of 53 independent states, 
Kiribati must take the reservations of Canada and Malta in mind seeing that these states are 
too members of the Commonwealth and have declared that disputes with any other member 
state shall be settled “in such manner as the parties have agreed or shall agree”.348 As the 
Commonwealth does not stipulate any dispute settlement mechanism of its own, and rather 
sees itself as a forum of negotiations, this indicates that Kiribati, if the dispute is to be 
adjudicated, would have to take recourse to ICJ’s other ways of obtaining jurisdiction.349  
     In conclusion, as it is unlikely that the states which are not subject to ICJ’s compulsory 
jurisdiction would willingly subject themselves to the Court ruling on the legality of their 
emissions, the states which have accepted the compulsory jurisdiction would be a viable 
solution. However, as can be seen, the reservation of the various state parties does make the 
establishment of jurisdiction difficult. 
     Furthermore, in the event, that Kiribati was to establish jurisdiction in a contentious case it 
is likely that the respondent state would argue the indispensable party principle. The principle 
was first stated in the Monetary Gold case350 and stipulates that the ICJ cannot rule on the 
lawfulness of the international conduct of one state, if it by doing so, it would rule on such 
conduct of another state, in the latter’s absence and without its consent.351 However, the ICJ 
has applied the principle to a varying extent in its case law, depending on the question and the 
circumstances of the case. The principle is argued to only apply in “extreme cases where the 
interest of an absent state is so closely related to the subject-matter of a dispute that it makes 
it impossible to limit the adjudication to the rights and interests of the applicant and the 
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respondent.”352 In the present case, the state will likely argue that the question of the legality 
of GHG-emissions is a matter which is of relevance to all states, and that they thereby will be 
affected by the outcome of the case.  
5.7.2 Advisory Opinion  
     Kiribati would have a choice between requesting the UNGA or the SC to seek an 
Advisory Opinion from the ICJ and engaging in contentious litigation. In several aspects, the 
Advisory route would have several benefits. Firstly, it is naturally less antagonistic which 
would reduce the risks of pointing fingers and creating political hardships. Secondly, it would 
circumvent several pressing procedural issues seeing that no specific defendants would be 
chosen and there would be no need to obtain jurisdiction over states. Furthermore, since the 
issue would be of a more general character, the need to establish causality between the 
actions or omissions and the damage would play a smaller part in the process.353 Fourthly, it 
would have the advantage to set a clear legal standard applicable to all states.354 
     However, concerning Kiribati’s claim there are important disadvantages regarding an 
Advisory Opinion. Firstly, an Advisory Opinion on climate change would be of a general 
character and a claim for remedies would not be possible seeing that Advisory Opinions are 
not binding but rather a tool of interpreting current stands in international law. Adaptation 
measures are important and need to be specific for each state, an Advisory Opinion would 
therefore not lead to a direct migration scheme for Kiribati but could provide a tool to 
negotiate one. Furthermore, it would require the support of the UNGA. In the case of Palau’s 
call for an Advisory Opinion this has gained increased support by several nations and 
currently over 30 states worldwide have stated their support to the initiative. The supporting 
states are representing all continents from across Asia, Africa, South America and Europe. 
However, the increased support has also lead to diplomatic pressure from big emitters such as 
the US and China which have increasingly shown an aversion to the initiative.355 It could be 
argued that many states may be reluctant to let the ICJ rule on the legality of their own 
emissions.  
     Furthermore, Strauss argues that vis-à-vis public value a contentious case between and 
identifiable applicant and defendant could function as a better tool in order to capture the 
public imagination and moral support.356  
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6 Analysis and Conclusion 
6.1 Current Protection of Climate Induced Migrants 
     The question on how climate induced migration shall be regulated is a difficult one as it 
relates to multifaceted issue. An international framework for protection must cover many 
different forms of migration, and an unclear number of migrants where the environmental 
factor is of varying importance. The topic of climate induced migration is furthermore a 
difficult issue to regulate as it depends upon the states’ abilities to adapt to climate change, an 
endeavor in which some states will succeed better than others. As can be seen from the 
current adaptation measures, they are not sufficient and although it is a relatively new topic in 
the COP negotiations, the current climate change funds have proven inefficient, creating 
difficulties for states such as Kiribati in the forms of human resources as well as in relation to 
the allocation of funds.  
    Extending protection through the adoption of a new convention or through the amendment 
of the current Refugee Convention from 1951 is difficult on the same grounds as bilateral and 
regional arrangements are not a preferred solution, i.e. they are all subject to political will and 
public opinion. As McAdam notes, the states are currently pursuing to restrict the protection 
of the current refugee framework and it is thereby unlikely that they would extend the 
protection further in the near future. Thus, while the legislator in the developed states can 
choose whether to grant or not grant entry into a state, the choices of the Kiribati migrant will 
not be as multifaceted. The Government’s proposal to “migrate with dignity” is of great 
importance, educating the I-Kiribati is a positive aspect, however, it does not alter fact that 
the decision still lies in the hands of the developed state. The I-Kiribati could all be well-
educated, but if the labour market of the respective country is filled, their efforts would still 
not make them attractive migrants. They would not be able to migrate with dignity, despite 
the fact that they are migrating from an issue they did not cause upon themselves.  
     However, as can be seen in the case of Teitiota v. MBIE and the various statements made 
by IPCC and Kiribati government officials, the issue is becoming increasingly imminent. 
This thesis therefore pursued to examine whether the issue of climate induced migration, 
especially regarding Kiribati, could be solved within the current international framework. 
Establishing state responsibility would thereby not only be a way of migration, but an actual 
way of migrating with dignity by making the efforts of the developed states not a form of aid, 
but an actual obligation.  
6.2 Can State Responsibility be Established in 
Practice?  
     As noted, the legal hurdles arising in the quest of establishing state responsibility are 
many. The discussion on whether the obligations in the UNFCCC are binding illustrates the 
negotiators’ intentions to keep the provisions deliberately unclear. In the author’s opinion it is 
questionable if the provisions in Article 4 stipulate binding obligations, however, concerning 
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the objects and purposes of the Convention, it is likely that a Court would accept an argument 
based on Article 2 and 4.2 UNFCCC in conjunction. Article 2 UNFCCC stipulates an 
obligation to stabilise greenhouse gas concentrations and if parties were continuously allowed 
to breach the objectives and purposes of a Treaty, the said treaty would be inoperative. 
However, it is likely that a party to the Kyoto Protocol, who has met its obligations, would 
argue that the UNFCCC has been superseded by the Protocol. In such a case it could be 
difficult to argue that obligations are breached on the basis of the UNFCCC.  
     Furthermore, the no-harm rule could form an important foundation for a prospective 
claim. Having the status of international customary law, it is binding upon all states which 
would create an arena for holding large emitters such as the US accountable. Moreover, it 
could be argued that states which are meeting their Kyoto obligations by means of the 
Protocol’s flexibility mechanisms still breach the no-harm rule as they continue to increase 
the GHG-emissions in absolute numbers.  
     As the states have signed the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol they have an obligation to 
ensure that the Conventions are complied with which thereby creates attribution. Thus, 
regarding the no-harm rule it could be argued that it in itself, stipulates a form of attribution 
requirement seeing that the states have an obligation to ensure that their territory is not used 
in a way that harms other states where the lack of overall control could be attributed to the 
state.  
     Furthermore, regarding both the UNFCCC and the no-harm rule the enshrined 
proportionality assessments makes it difficult for a state as Kiribati to argue that the 
obligations have been breached. As the obligation in the UNFCCC is one of conduct, and the 
no-harm rule is subject to a standard of care, a majority of states could argue that they have 
taken measures and that these fulfil both obligations. In such a case, large emitters such as the 
US, and states such as Canada, which withdrew their ratification of the Protocol, could be in 
breach of their obligations as their actions indicate non-compliance with the object and 
purpose of the Convention. Furthermore, and more specifically, states which have continued 
to increase their emissions since the entry into force of the Convention, and under the no-
harm rule, e.g. Turkey could be potential respondents.  
     It has been argued that the greatest legal hurdles are posed in the criteria of causality. With 
regards to factual causation, greater scientific certainty will establish general causation and 
by using the ‘contribute to’ test, specific causation can be proved as states’ individual actions 
contribute to the damage incurred by Kiribati or by any other state seeking to establish state 
responsibility. As noted, the issue lies in proving proximate causation. States cannot be 
responsible for actions they did not foresee and as climate change has only been known for 
the past two decades which proves to be an enormous obstacle. The foreseeability criteria are 
of great importance and if a court were to stretch causation beyond them, it would lead to 
enormous implications for international law and lead to a situation where states would be 
held responsible for their conduct beyond reason. It is thereby unlikely that a court would rule 
in Kiribati’s favour on pre-1990 emissions and as these are the emissions which mainly have 
contributed to Kiribati’s injury, it would be difficult to claim remedies. However, it should be 
noted that the issue of causation is only relevant regarding reparation claims. States can 
thereby still be found to be in breach of the climate change framework by not stabilising their 
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emissions or by not adhering to their QUELRO’s, and such a case could form an important 
precedent for states at the negotiating table.  
6.3 Could the Protection of Migrants be Awarded as 
a Remedy?  
    Regarding the core question of the thesis, if protection to migrants could be awarded on the 
basis of state responsibility, that question also poses difficulties and mirrors the inefficiencies 
of current international law when applied to the climate change problem. As migration not 
being an actual remedy under ASR it is difficult to imagine how a Court would approach the 
matter if state responsibility was established. As noted, that imposes an important 
assumption, namely that state responsibility is established. 
     Furthermore, Kiribati would have difficulties with the establishment of state responsibility 
in practice, as the recognition of the compulsory jurisdiction of the ICJ is voluntary. This 
limits the scope of possible defendants and makes a contentious case difficult to instigate. 
Currently the Warsaw Loss and Damage Mechanism is under development and it is difficult 
to make any assumptions on if the Mechanism will function as a special mechanism for 
establishing accountability for climate change damages. However, it could prove an 
important component in the future. If it was developed into a mechanism establishing 
accountability and awarded remedies based on current emissions, thereby circumventing the 
causality issue, it could prove important.  
6.4 Conclusion 
     In conclusion, an advisory opinion would be the preferred option for Kiribati. It would not 
make it possible to claim relocation as a remedy, but if responsibility was established, it 
could form an important alteration of the dynamics at the negotiating table. State 
responsibility could thereby be used to claim migration, not through litigation, but at the 
negotiating table.  
      State responsibility will be difficult to establish as every step in the establishment is 
unclear. This is an imminent issue as climate change law with regards to mitigation has 
perfected the art of postponing. As can be seen from the UNFCCC, the Kyoto Protocol and 
the numerous negotiations in the COP’s, pledges are made for the future and when breached, 
there is a tendency not to impose procedures to ensuring compliance or penalties in any way, 
but rather to look forward and say “post-2015, we will reach an agreement then”. Such trends 
can be seen from the beginning of the UNFCCC which to date has not fulfilled its functions 
of mitigating absolute numbers of GHG-emissions to a level which is sustainable. With the 
exception of the Kyoto Protocol, the commitments might or might not be binding, thereby 
making them volatile. They are subject to changes of public opinion, changes of governments 
and numerous other factors. Keeping that in mind, the urgent matter does call for a more 
active approach, and especially a legally binding one.  
     However, state responsibility is contingent upon the primary rules, which must be 
breached. In the present case one can thereby note that public international law displays its 
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weaknesses, it does not have a larger scope, or more legally binding regulations, than the 
states want it to have. The provisions in the UNFCCC were deliberately weakened, as a result 
of the negotiations with various states with different incentives and backgrounds. 
Furthermore, states can choose to sign the Kyoto Protocol, and, as in the case of Canada, 
decide to withdraw the ratification when realising that it will not be able to meet the targets. 
Nevertheless, as the sea level continues to rise the I-Kiribati are becoming increasingly 
vulnerable.  
    This could lead to the supposition that international law is ill fitted as a tool to establish 
accountability for climate change. However, many of the tools stipulated in international law 
form valuable mechanisms for the establishment of accountability and the issue lies in the 
way they will be use by the state. A change, perhaps driven by public opinion, could form an 
incentive for states to create legally binding obligations, and more importantly, to create 
enforcement mechanisms ensuring compliance, thereby making mitigation of GHG-
emissions an important factor in the decision-making process. However, it is not certain that 
the I-Kiribati will be aided by such efforts when forced to leave their birth land in the pursuit 
of a new home.  
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